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THE DECLINE AND FALL OF 
TAXABLE INCOME 
Glenn E. Coven* 
The basic function of any system of taxation is to distribute the 
costs of government over the general population according to a 
preconceived design or tax base.I Under the historic structure of the 
federal income tax, the basis for this cost distribution has been the 
taxable income2 of each taxpaying individual or entity. But" the In-
ternal Revenue Code's highly refined computation of taxable income 
has never been the exclusive mechanism for allocating the burden of 
taxation, 3 and over the past two decades Congress has, with increas-
ing frequency, deliberately disregarded taxable income as the mech-
anism for allocating the burdens of taxation. Significantly, Congress 
has not replaced this traditional mechanism with another con-
sciously evolved tax base. On the contrary, recent legislation has in-
jected secondary allocation mechanisms into the tax structure on an 
entirely ad hoc basis. 
The consequences of this erosion of the taxable income mecha-
nism uniformly have been unsatisfactory. First, although the use of 
secondary mechanisms to allocate the burden of taxation is not in-
herently inequitable, in practice the mechanisms adopted by Con-
*, Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A. 1963, Swarthmore College; LL.B. 1966, 
Columbia University. - Ed. 
1. It is important to distinguish between the purpose of a broadly based tax and the pur-
pose of an income tax. The primary purpose of any broadly based tax is the production of 
revenue for the taxing authority; that is, the transfer of command over society's store of goods 
and services from the private to the public sector. The selection of the base upon which such a 
tax is to be imposed requires a judgment concerning who should bear the loss in the private 
sector and in what proportion. Although other criteria exist, the primary criterion for both the 
selection of that tax base and for the refinement or definition of that base is distributional 
equity. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 187-
93 (1973). The primary purpose of an income tax is to allocate the aggregate loss within the 
private sector fairly with respect to the selected tax base, income. 
2. Taxable income is defined with some circularity by I.R.C. §§ 61-63, as all income less all 
allowable deductions including the personal exemptions. To the extent that deductions are not 
permitted for expenditures for consumption, the subtraction should equal the taxpayer's con-
sumption plus net change in savings - subject, of course, to definitional deviations from the 
ideal. 
3. The best known, and perhaps most controversial, exception is the reduced rate of tax 
applied to capital gains. That preferred rate was introduced by the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 
136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 233 (currently codified at I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1221), and has persisted to the 
present. See generally Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Fed-
eral Income Tax 1913-1948, 2 NATL. TAX J. 12 (1949). This circumvention of taxable income 
as the mechanism for allocating tax liability is subject to many of the same criticisms made 
herein of other Code provisions. 
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gress have significantly reduced the distributional equity of the 
federal income tax. Second, as the ultimate tax burden has become 
disassociated from the putative tax base, the income tax has become 
political and irrational. Finally, the introduction of alternative and 
supplementary mechanisms has substantially increased the structural 
complexity of the income tax. 
After first exploring the intellectual climate that has facilitated 
the congressional disregard of taxable income, this Article will ex-
amine three areas in which taxable income is no longer the exclusive 
mechanism for allocating the burden of taxation. That examination 
will outline the undesirable consequences of the decline of taxable 
income, and demonstrate that Congress need not have disregarded 
taxable income to secure the desired pattern of taxation. Because the 
use of multiple rate schedules constitutes the most significant devia-
tion from the concept of taxable income in terms of the number of 
taxpayers that it affects and the popular resentment against the tax 
laws that it produces, the propriety of those schedules will be ex-
amined most extensively. Thereafter, the Article will address more 
briefly the increasing role of the zero bracket amount and the un-
happy history of the attack on the excessive use of tax preferences. 
In each instance, the use of a properly revised computation of taxa-
ble income rather than a secondary mechanism to allocate the bur-
den of taxation would produce a superior pattern of taxation, and 
eliminate many undesirable side effects. 
Before commencing, however, two definitional matters require 
attention. First, the Code's definition of taxable income obviously 
differs vastly from the classical theoretical definition of the appropri-
ate income tax base. Requirements of administrative practicality, 
particularly those underlying the concept of realization, severely re-
strict current taxation of the aggregate net changes in wealth that are 
included in the Haig-Simons formulation of the tax base.4 More-
over, a long series of exclusions and deductions added to the Code 
for reasons of public policy or private preference result in failure to 
tax substantial accretions to wealth. Each of these theoretically im-
proper modifications of the tax base deviates from an ideal computa-
tion of taxable income. Such modifications, however, are not the 
subject of the present criticism. Rather, by the disregard of taxable 
4. The Haig-Simons definition of net income defines personal income as "the algebraic 
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value 
of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question." 
H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). See R. HAIG, The Concept of Income, in 
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1921), reprinted in AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, READ-
INGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (1959), 
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income, I refer to the computation of the income tax actually pay-
able by reference to some mechanism other than taxable income as 
so modified. 5 
Second, the general configuration of taxable income traditionally 
employed in our tax laws is not the only sound basis for imposing a 
broadly based tax. Indeed, the persuasiveness of some current criti-
cisms of a tax on income6 is one of the causes of the congressional 
disregard of taxable income. The present objection to that disregard 
does not imply a rejection of those criticisms, nor.does it constitute a 
defense of the income tax. 7 My criticisms are directed instead to the 
imposition of tax upon a proliferation of tax bases, each of which 
applies to only a limited segment of the population rather than upon 
a single, rationally designed tax base. 8 
I. THE INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT OF TAX LEGISLATION 
To understand why Congress has undercut the traditional mech-
anism for allocating the burden of taxation, we must consider, at 
least cursorily, the intellectual environment in which tax legislation 
is formed. Tax legislation, of course, emerges from the shifting and 
uncertain forces that constitute the political process.9 As a result, we 
can identify no single explanation for the gradual abandonment of 
taxable income as the sole mechanism for distributing the burden of 
taxation. Indeed, recent tax legislation has often been the almost ac-
5. These secondary mechanisms include the use of such alternative tax bases as adjusted 
gross income, alternative minimum taxable income, and the sum of specified items of tax pref-
erence. Multiple rate schedules further erode the role of taxable income as the mechanism for 
allocating the burden of taxation because more than one rate of tax can be applied to the same 
taxable income. The limited scope of this Article does not suggest that a bright line separates 
modifications of a tax base from mechanisms supplementing the tax base. A class of income 
such as capital gains may be favored either through the definition of the tax base (i.e., permit-
ting the exclusion of one half of the net gain), or through the use of a secondary mechanism 
(i.e., subjecting net gains to tax under a separate rate schedule). In general, however, secon-
dary mechanisms more greatly distort the proper allocation of tax liability because of their 
greater independence from the generally applicable tax base and rate schedule. 
6. See notes 12-21 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
7. I should, however, admit to a bias in favor of the general configuration of the present 
income tax. The blanket deferral of tax upon unexercised accumulations of economic power 
that would occur under a consumption tax seems both unfair and socially undesirable. More-
over, to the extent that the personal deductions reflect material differences in the capacity for 
discretionary consumption, they appropriately refine a humane and equitable income tax. 
8. This Article considers the decline of taxable income because taxable income, at least 
nominally, is the tax base employed in our system. If the present income tax were replaced by 
a tax upon consumption alone, disregarding that new tax base in subsequent tax legislation 
would be just as objectionable as the legislation considered herein. 
9. For a discussion, see Sunley,A Tax Preference Is Born: A Legislative History of the New 
Jobs Tax Credit, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 391 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980); 
Surrey, The Congress and the Tax .Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 
HAR.v. L. Rev. 1145 (1957). 
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cidental product of political compromise and expediency. For ex-
ample, Congress adopted the alternative minimum tax, 10 the most 
recent arid least defensible erosion of the taxable income base, pri-
marily to reduce the rate of taxation of capital gains. 11 But while the 
specific causes of the present trend are largely irrational, the com-
promises reached would not have so casually disregarded the taxable 
income mechanism if its value had been unquestioned. Challenges 
to income taxation, problems with the definition of taxable income, 
doubts about whether the choice of tax bases has any economic im-
pact, and the ascendancy of objectives that compete with distribu-
tional equity have created an environment distinctly hostile to the 
concept of taxable income. 
A. .Doubts Concerning Income Taxation 
There are many possible bases upon which a broadly based tax 
might be imposed. Taxable income is merely one possibility, and 
may not be the best among the competing options. Some theorists 
have always argued that mere accretions to wealth should not be 
taxed. 12 In their view, it is inappropriate to tax unexercised rights to 
obtain a greater share of society's production of goods and services; 
rather, we should tax only the exercise of those rights. Although it is 
not clear why it is morally or technically preferable to curtail con-
sumptive capacity through taxation when the consumption occurs 
rather than when the potential for consumption arises, it is clear that 
an expenditure or consumption tax would exempt from tax the full 
amount of income dedicated to savings and investment. Thus, rela-
tive to a tax on income, a consumption-based tax should encourage 
the formation of private capital.13 Because the American economy 
currently appears unable to attract new investment capital, a tax 
based upon consumption is appealing.14 
The proponents of consumption taxation, however, do not base 
their proposals upon supposed benefits to the economy, which would 
clearly be a matter of nontax policy. Rather, they assert the superi-
10. I.R.C. § SS. 
11. See H.R. REP. No. 9S-144S, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 122, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 7046, 71SO. The alternative minimum tax is criticized in the text accom-
panying notes 125-29 iefra. 
12. See, e.g., I. FISHER & H. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION 48-SS (1942); N. 
KAI.DOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 37-41 (195S). 
13. See R. GOODE, The Individual Income Tax 38-45 (rev. ed. 1976). 
14. Serious consideration has been given to replacing taxable income as the mechanism for 
allocating the burden of taxation with consumption alone. For a government study, see U.S. 
DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977); for nongovernmental 
views, see notes 1S-21 iefra and accompanying text. 
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ority of a consumption tax both as a matter of economic efficiency 
and distributive justice. The argument rests not so much upon an 
assserted theoretical superiority of the consumption tax but rather 
upon a distaste for the existing definition of the income tax base and 
a pessimism about the possibilities for meaningful improvement of 
that definition. 15 Thus Professor Andrews, the primary modem pro-
ponent of consumption taxation, 16 argues that the realization re-
quirement and numerous ad hoc exclusions and deductions from 
income dedicated to specified forms of savings cause gross disparities 
of treatment among similarly situated taxpayers. His suggestion that 
the taxing system's overall distributional equity would be improved 
by exempting from taxation all dedications of income to savings rests 
upon the assumption that the instances in which tax is presently de-
ferred cannot rationally be distinguished from those instances in 
which tax is imposed immediately.17 
A second major premise of the argument for the consumption tax 
is the allegation that savings are taxed twice under an income tax.1 8 
That double taxation, it is said, is inequitable because those who de-
fer their consumption are taxed more heavily than those who con-
sume immediately, and is inefficient because it induces consumers to 
prefer consumption over savings.19 This double taxation argument 
has been disputed by those who prefer an income tax.20 If interest 
earned on savings represents reimbursement for the loss of immedi-
ate consumption, then it is not truly a gain properly subject to taxa-
tion. But if that interest compensates for the deferral of 
consumption by engendering greater future consumptive capacity, 
15. See Brown, Comments, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 113-
17 (J. Pechman ed. 1980); Gunn, The Case far an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. R.E.v. 370, 399 
(1979). 
A similar pessimism may in part be responsible for the current interest in value added 
taxation. See H.R. 5665, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1979). 
16. See Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. 
R.E.v. 1113 (1974). 
17. Id at 1117-18, 1128-40. That assumption is not unchallenged. See Goode, The Superi-
ority of the Income Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?, 63-70 (J. 
Pechman ed. 1980). For a general critique of the assertions of equitable superiority by con-
sumption tax advocates; see Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income 
Tax?, 89 YALE LJ. 1081 (1980). 
18. See R. GOODE, supra note 13, at 25-26; Andrews, supra note 16, at 1167-69; Gunn, 
supra note 15, at 372-78. 
19. See Bradford, The Case far a Personal Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: 
INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? (J. Pechman ed. 1980); Mieszkowski, The Advisability and Feasibil-
ity of an Expenditure Tax System, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (H. Aaron & M. Boskin 
eds. 1980). 
20. Gunn, supra note 15; Warren, supra note 17, at 1097-101. Professor Warren's prefer-
ences are less clear. 
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then it should be taxed like any other form of compensation. For 
present purposes, resolving these competing characterizations is not 
as important as recognizing that substantial doubts have been raised 
about the propriety of including a major component of taxable in-
come in an ideal tax base.21 
B. Doubts Concerning Taxable Income 
Translating the Haig-Simons definition of income into a work-
able statutory formulation requires subjective judgments. It is not 
surprising that tax specialists have never reached a consensus on 
many of these judgments, and it is unlikely that they ever will. Con-
gress, therefore, must make legislative decisions without the benefit 
of a clearly articulated theoretical underpinning. Although uncer-
tainty is neither new nor unique to tax legislation, the period of re-
form that emerged in the 1960s significantly heightened the visibility 
and intensity of the debate. In particular, the Treasury Depart-
ment's adoption of the Tax Expenditure Budget22 in 1969 sparked 
substantial debate over the form that an ideal income tax should as-
sume. The scope of the current debate is well illustrated by two sep-
arate arguments about the judgments underlying the Tax 
Expenditure Budget. 
The first argument concerns the propriety of deductions for ex-
penditures that unquestionably derive from personal consumption, 
such as the medical expense, casualty loss, and personal interest de-
ductions.23 Not surprisingly, the Treasury Department consistently 
has included all of these allowances in its yearly Tax Expenditure 
Budget.24 This characterization provoked one of the first attacks on 
the Treasury's definition of tax expenditures - Professor Andrews's 
defense of the medical expense deduction.25 Arguing that health is a 
21. Professor Andrews injected an additional ingredient in the debate by his recent sugges-
tion that it might be preferable to use a consumption tax to supplement, rather than to replace, 
an income tax. Andrews, A Supplemental Personal Expenditure Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BB 
TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 127 (J. Pechman ed. 1980). 
22. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1977-1981, at 183-212 (1980). For the history of the adoption 
of the Tax Expenditure Budget, sees. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); and-Sur-
rey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 
20 B.C. L. REv. 225 (1979). 
23. For a brief history of the emergence of these deductions, see R. GooDE, supra note 13, 
at 147-75; and Hellenbrand, Itemized Deductions far Personal Expenses and Standard Deduc-
tions in the Income Tax Law, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 
TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 375 (Comm. Print 1959). 
24. See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 22. Tax expenditures are 
classified in the budget by function under a relatively few, and somewhat debatable, headings. 
Thus, the casualty loss deduction appears under the heading "income security." 
25. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV, 309 (1972), 
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norm or zero base, rather than a gain, and that medical care is a 
form of forced consumption,26 Andrews concluded that the medical 
expense deduction should be part of an ideal income tax rather than 
a tax expenditure budget. In response to Andrews's attack on the 
Treasury's position, Professor Kelman argued that because medical 
expenses, particularly of the relatively wealthy, are inseparable from 
pure consumption, the medical expense deduction was unjustifi-
able.27 Kelman's closely reasoned analysis demonstrates that the de-
duction results in a loss of both vertical and horizontal equity to the 
extent that medical expenses represent consumption. But Andrews 
had conceded that imperfections accompany the deduction. Thus, 
although both authors present detailed arguments, in the end both 
concede that their conclusions rest on subjective preference.28 
Both efforts advanced our understanding of this and perhaps all 
personal deductions, but the message communicated to Congress is 
ambiguous. Perhaps a deduction is properly allowable for true med-
ical expenses. But definitional and administrative problems preclude 
that optimal solution. Whether the next best solution is to allow or 
disallow deductions cannot be resolved without a subjective judg-
ment. Academic debate has thus left unanswered the question 
whether certain personal consumption expenditures constitute taxa-
ble income. 29 
A second major issue concerning the Tax Expenditure Budget -
accelerated depreciation - illustrates dramatically the current de-
bate over the definition of taxable income. For many, the invest-
ment incentive inherent in accelerated depreciation constitutes the 
prototypical tax preference. Permitting recovery of capital at a rate 
26. Professor Andrews never expressly argued that income devoted to health maintenance 
should be exempt from tax because the expenditure was forced. Nevertheless, his view of 
expenditures for medical care as involuntary permeates his analysis and is critical to it. 
27. Kelman, Personal .Deductions Revisited· Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax 
and Why They Fit Worse in a Far .from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831 (1979). 
28. Andrews observed that "[w]hat distinguishes medical expenses from other personal ex-
penses at bottom is a sense that large differences in their magnitude between people in other-
wise similar circumstances are apt to reflect differences in need rather than choices among 
gratifications." Andrews, supra note 25, at 336. And Kelman confesses that 
[m]y hostility to an expenditure-oriented medical care deduction is sharpened by my feel-
ing that a capitalist system encourages its members to disguise their ability to pay in order 
to avoid taxes. . . . While the government could interpret a "standard" ("deduct reason-
able medical expenditures") to serve the ultimate purpose of measuring true ability to 
pay, standards are inevitably non-administrable and prejudically enforced. 
Kelman supra note 27, at 880-81 (emphasis original). 
29. For a recent analysis of the propriety of the deduction for personal taxes, see Turnier, 
Evaluating Personal .Deductions in an Income Tax - The Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 262 
(1981). The author concludes, among other things, that it is unclear whether expenditures for 
state and local sales and property taxes represent consumption but that their deductibility 
should probably be retained for reasons of nontax policy. Id at 295. 
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that exceeds its economic deterioration appears certain to understate 
taxable income. Yet Professor Kahn asserts that a highly accelerated 
method of depreciation is at least as defensible as any other 
method.30 Arguing that the cost of a depreciable asset should be al-
located over time relative to the present value of the annual rights to 
use that asset, Kahn suggests that the exhaustion of those rights need 
not be offset by the appreciation in value of the subsequent rights of 
use attributable solely to the passage of time. In essence, Kahn's 
argument is that such ''built-in" appreciation is not different in kind 
from other sources of appreciation, and is not realized by the mere 
use of an asset.31 Because the present value of a future right to use 
an asset declines over time, Kahn's argument justifies a sharply ac-
celerated method of depreciation. 
Kahn contrasts his argument with Professor Chirelstein's position 
that the only theoretically accurate method of depreciation is the de-
celerated sinking fund method. 32 Sinking fund depreciation starts 
from the unexceptional premise that depreciation should mirror the 
economic deterioration of the asset, and thus may not exceed the 
difference between the asset's fair market values at the beginning 
and the end of the year. Since that difference will equal the present 
value of the most distant right in time, the depreciation pattern pro-
duced will be decelerated. In fact, because the sinking fund compu-
tation automatically encompasses the appreciation in value of the 
remaining rights, the pattern of depreciation produced is precisely 
the opposite of that defended by Kahn. 
Kahn's breach with orthodoxy drew an immediate and relatively 
(for the legal literature) harsh response. Rejecting both Kahn's re-
fusal to offset the appreciation in the asset against depreciation and 
Chirelstein's use of an interest rate to project deterioration, Professor 
Blum concludes that the straight-line method produces the most de-
fensible rate of depreciation.33 As with the questions concerning the 
concept of income taxation, the validity of the competing arguments 
is not presently important. What is important is the lack of confi-
dence that the arguments disclose in the definition of taxable in-
come. 34 
30. Kahn, Accelerated .Depreciation - Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring 
Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
31. Id. at 51-54. 
32. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 131-35 (2d ed. 1979). 
33. Blum, Accelerated .Depreciation: A Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?! I, 18 
MICH. L. REv. 1172 (1980). But see Kahn, Accelerated .Depreciation Revisited -A Reply to 
Professor Blum, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1185 (1980). 
34. Needless to say, the text hardly exhausts the range of the current debate over the 
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That doubts about the propriety of the existing definition of tax-
able income could result in indecisive and eroding legislation is un-
derstandable. If, in addition, Congress has reason to question 
whether disregarding the traditional tax base will in fact adversely 
affect the distributional equity of the tax laws, the erosion of the tax 
base in the face of conflicting pressures within the legislative process 
would seem inevitable. Recent scholarship, of course, has suggested 
precisely that. 
The currently fashionable economic analysis of the law,35 asap-
plied to income taxation,36 has provided- or perhaps merely popu-
larized - several insights that have much improved our analytical 
tools. Economic theory suggests, for example, that the correct point 
at which to assess the distributional effect of a taxing system is after, 
rather than before, the application of tax.37 Thus it is inappropriate 
to condemn a seeming favoritism within the Code without taking 
into account the economic responses that it produces. Tax prefer-
ences, for example, carry with them their own seeds of destruction. 
The increased rate of return on investment that a preference pro-
duces will be bargained away in the marketplace, and this process 
restores a competitive return and eliminates the preference. 38 In 
Professor Bittker's i;ricely turned phrase, the inequities are driven out 
by the (inefficient) misallocations. 
This analysis, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the 
taxing system is supremely equitable or that revision is totally unnec-
essary. On the contrary, one can condemn the misallocation of re-
sources that results from a preference with a vigor equal to the wrath 
of those who perceive the law as inequitable. But for a legislator 
who wishes to adjust the economy by guiding resources into favored 
projects, the economists' message is encouraging. In short, efficiency 
proper definition of an income tax base. For another area of controversy, see Dodge, Beyond 
Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 
(1978); Rudick, A Proposal for an Accessions Tax, 1 TAX. L. REV. 25 (1945). 
35. For an indication of how currently fashionable, see Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal 
Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980);A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 811 (1980). 
36. For a brief but general discussion of the economic effects of income taxation, see J. 
DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE (1977). 
37. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: .Do Misallocalions .Drive Out Ineq-
uities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 739-42; Buchanan & Brennan, Tax Reform Without Tears, 
in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 33, 36-47 (J. Aaron & M. Baskin eds. 1980). 
38. Bittker, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization or .Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, 
28 NATL. TAX J. 416 (1975). 
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analysis suggests that the ideal structure of an income tax can be 
disregarded without introducing more than a transitory distortion of 
its distributional equity. 
Then again, even fledgling students of economics appreciate the 
dangers of applying a theoretical model that assumes the existence of 
a perfect market and a hypothetical economically rational man.39 
And while the inefficiencies created by our countless preferences 
may drive out some inequities, they may also produce new inequi-
ties.40 Despite these shortcomings, economic analysis, like the 
doubts about the propriety of income taxation and challenges to the 
definition of taxable income, has contributed to the recent decline of 
taxable income. 
D. The Ascendancy of Competing Objectives 
Like any complex legislation, the tax laws reflect a balance 
among several competing and often inconsistent objectives. Al-
though distributive justice may be the most important objective of a 
system of taxation, it remains only one objective among many. Be-
cause the Code reaches into every comer of economic life, as well as 
into many aspects of nonfinancial life, Congress can use it as a tool 
for social engineering. Uses of the tax laws unrelated to the ideal 
allocation of the costs of government may be lamented, but it is un-
likely that Congress will abstain from using the tax laws to pursue 
nontax goals. 
Although Congress has long used the Code to implement nontax 
policy, a second competing objective recently has emerged in the 
"simplification" movement. Without question, simplicity and ease 
of comprehension are legitimate and important objectives of any 
law. Time unnecessarily spent in reporting income detracts from 
more productive endeavors, and is resented. That resentment can 
create taxpayer hostility, which can, in tum, impede the collection of 
revenues.41 Even in the absence of such taxpayer hostility, total pre-
occupation with distributional equity would prove counterproduc-
tive at some point. As the law becomes increasingly fine-tuned to 
allow for subtle distinctions among taxpayers, it unavoidably be-
39. See Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 281, 297-
306 (1979). 
40. For an interesting demonstration that inefficiencies, or misallocations, may drive out 
some inequities but produce others, see Shreiber, Inequality in the Tax Treatment of Owner-
Occupied Homes, 31 NATL. TAX J. 101 (1978). 
41. See Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the Income Tax Base, in HOUSE 
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 77 
(Comm. Print 1959). 
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comes more complex and difficult to understand. If the law cannot 
be comprehended, it can be neither obeyed nor enforced, and its sub-
tle distinctions will be to no avail. 
Although simplification is a legitimate goal, the optimum balance 
between the sometimes competing objectives of simplification and 
distributional equity is not self-evident. Clearly, simplification must 
not override distributional equity. The most simple income tax, a 
flat wage tax, would do substantial violence to the consensus expec-
tations of distributional equity. But as doubts concerning the valid-
ity of the definition of taxable income and the importance of 
preserving that definition increase, Congress may tolerate increas-
ingly greater sacrifices of the definition of taxable income to achieve 
"simplification" or to execute another nontax policy. 
The point where the costs of a loss of distributional equity exceed 
the benefits of simplification is not susceptible to scientific measure-
ment. However, there is some evidence for a concern that Congress 
has become willing to tolerate too great a sacrifice of equity in the 
name of simplification. The adoption of the zero bracket amount 
floor on itemized deductions is one example.42 Another is the substi-
tution of a credit for the preexisting child care deduction.43 Con-
gress adopted the credit to permit taxpayers not itemizing their 
deductions to claim the allowance - a desirable result.44 Yet the 
distributional effects of the credit are inferior to a deduction.45 
These amendments eroded the role of taxable income as the Code's 
distributional mechanism, and did so, in part, because of an exces-
sive preoccupation with simplification. A third, and more significant 
deference to simplification partly explains the retroactive repeal of 
the carryover basis rule of section 10_23.46 That legislative retreat did 
not erode the taxable income mechanism, but rather perpetuated one 
of its most dubious definitional components, and thus it lies outside 
the primary focus of this Article. However, Congress's inability to 
sustain one of the most significant reforms of the Code since its 
adoption in the face of perceived administrative complexities dem-
42. See text at note 106 infra. 
43. I.R.C. § 44A. 
44. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1975). 
45. See note 83 infra. 
46. Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stal 231 (1980). While many factors contributed to the 
repeal of carryover basis, the Senate Finance Committee explained its action in the following 
language: "The committee believes that the carryover basis provisions are unduly compli-
cated. The Committee therefore believes that the carryover basis provisions should be re-
pealed." S. REP. No. 96-394, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 122, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
An. NEWS 410, 530-31. 
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onstrates the reversal of priorities that has accompanied the declin-
ing importance of the taxable income concept. 
The following pages document this decline in the role of taxable 
income. It is noteworthy that none of these erosions is deeply em-
bedded in the existing system of taxation. Except for the clearly un-
justifiable head-of-household rate schedule, all originated in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969.47 A guarded optimism that the present trend is 
reversible, therefore, is not unreasonable. 
II. EROSIONS OF IBE TAXABLE INCOME BASE 
A taxing system will lose a single basis for allocating the burden 
of taxation if it employs secondary allocation bases to supplement or 
replace the primary base, or if different rate schedules are applied to 
the primary base. The existing Code deviates from the exclusive use 
of taxable income in each of these ways, in one instance employing 
both a different base and a different rate schedule. Part II explores 
the principal erosions of taxable income and the difficulties that they 
have created. In addition, it attempts to demonstrate that the use of 
secondary allocation mechanisms was unnecessary, and that Con-
gress could have achieved a superior result by an appropriate modi-
fication of the definition of taxable income. 
A. Multiple Rate Schedules 
I. Historical Evolution 
Before 1948, the Code required all taxpayers to compute their tax 
liabilities by applying a single rate schedule to their individual tax-
able incomes.48 Except in community property states, it addressed 
disparities in taxpaying capacity between married and single taxpay-
ers solely through the personal exemptions. In community property 
states, however, spouses were entitled to divide community income 
and compute their tax liability separately, even though only one 
spouse had earned that income.49 Income split in this way was taxed 
at a lower marginal rate than the same level of income earned by one 
spouse in a common-law property state. 
In 1948, Congress eliminated this discrimination by permitting 
all married couples to treat their entire family income as if it had 
47. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
48. For the history of the taxation of the family unit, see H. GROVES, FEDERAL TAX 
TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY 59-69 (1963); Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 
STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1405-16 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bittker]. 
49. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 106 (1930). 
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been derived equally by the husband and the wife without regard to 
the actual source of that income.50 As a result, the tax payable by 
most married couples equalled twice the tax payable by a single tax-
payer who earned one half of the married couple's income. This 
adjustment of the tax burden was implemented through a second 
rate schedule applicable to the income reported on joint returns filed 
by married couples. But Congress adopted the second rate schedule 
solely for administrative convenience. The substance of the 1948 
amendment was to reallocate income within the family unit, and tax-
able income, as so reallocated, remained the sole determinant of in-
come tax liability.51 
Three years later, and with no indication that Congress appreci-
ated the significance of the step,52 it adopted an additional rate 
schedule that was not merely a matter of administrative convenience. 
Although the 1948 amendment had eliminated discrimination be-
tween married couples, it produced a new inequity. Splitting income 
between husbands and wives enabled married couples to pay less tax 
than single persons with the same level of income. This disparity of 
treatment was particularly acute for single taxpayers with depen-
dents. 53 Rather than directly address the adequacy of the allowance 
for dependents, Congress responded to the plight of single parents by 
adopting a new rate schedule for so-called heads of households. 54 
Somewhat arbitrarily, the tax liability for heads of households split 
the difference between the tax liabilities of married and single tax-
payers with the same level of income. 55 
Convinced that the discrepancy in tax burdens between married 
50. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 114 (now I.R.C. § l(a)(l)). 
51. McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simpl!fied Income 
Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1584 (1977). 
52. The 1948 amendment was correctly perceived as permitting the splitting of family in-
come between husband and wife. Professor Bittker has reported that, notwithstanding the 
availability of the benefits of joint filing by childless couples, the reform was viewed as a tax 
allowance for family responsibilities. Single parents then asserted that they too were entitled 
to such an allowance, and Congress evidently agreed. See Bittker, supra note 48, at 1417. 
Thus the Senate Finance Committee Report discloses that the Committee viewed the adoption 
of the head-of-household rate schedule as extending a modified form of income splitting to 
single parent families. S. REP. No. 817, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1969, 1971. The nature of the 1951 amendment, however, was very differ-
ent from that of the 1948 amendment. Income splitting among married couples is based upon 
a factual assumption concerning the pooling of family income that is rational if incomplete. 
See note 62 infra. The head-of-household schedule, by contrast, constituted an arbitrary rate 
reduction devoid of factual support. 
53. s. REP. No. 817, supra note 52, at 10-11, [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 
1978-79. 
54. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 301, 65 Stat. 480 (now I.R.C. § l(b)). 
55. S. REP. No. 817, supra note 52, at IO, [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1978 
(table 3); Bittker, supra note 48, at 1417. 
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couples and all single taxpayers was too great, Congress lowered the 
rate schedule for single taxpayers in 1969.56 Again somewhat arbi-
trarily, the 1969 amendment reduced by approximately one half the 
excess of the tax liability of a single person over the liability of a 
married couple on the same level of income.57 This rate reduction 
had a profound symbolic effect, for it formally disassociated the tax 
liabilities of married and single taxpayers. No longer could a mar-
ried couple determine its tax liability by merely attributing family 
income equally to each spouse. Beginning in 1970, then, the Code 
contained three separate rate schedules - for single persons, mar-
ried couples, and heads of households. But Congress also preserved 
the right of married couples to file separate returns under the pre-
1970 rate schedule applicable to single taxpayers,58 in effect creating 
a fourth rate schedule applicable to individual taxpayers. 
The 1969 legislation redressed the inequity between a married 
couple and a single person with the same income, but it may have 
created an inequity between married couples and two single individ-
uals whose combined income equalled that of the married couple. 
Since 1969 the combined tax payable by two single persons with ap-
proximately equal incomes has been less than the tax payable by a 
married couple with a family income equal to the combined income 
of the two single persons. As employed singles learned that marriage 
would increase their tax liability, substantial pressure emerged for 
relief from this "marriage penalty." Even today this pressure con-
tinues - providing a small reminder of the futility of attempts to 
eliminate inequities in the . system by promulgating additional rate 
structures. 
2. Critique of the Multiple Rate Structure 
Congress disassociated the relative tax burdens of married and 
single taxpayers in 1969 because the previous approaches appeared 
inequitable. Pre-1948 law imposed an excessive burden on married 
taxpayers, while the post-1948 equal attribution rule excessively bur-
dened single taxpayers. The need for a middle ground, however, did 
not mandate the adoption of separate rate schedules. For several 
reasons, that decision now appears questionable. 
First, the 1969 amendment adopted a complex set of four rate 
schedules, which confuses both taxpayers and tax collectors. Since 
56. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803(a), 83 Stat. 487 (now I.R.C. § l(b)), 
57. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 262, reprinted in (1969) U.S. Com, CoNo, & 
AD. NEWS 2027, 2297-98. 
58. I.R.C. § l(d) (amended 1977 and 1978). 
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several categories of taxpayers must be defined, fine and not wholly 
satisfactory lines must be drawn.59 Taxpayers must then understand 
those definitions and apply them to their own varying circumstances. 
Because the categories depend on voluntary conduct, the system in-
vites abuse and tax avoidance.60 "Tax-divorces," although more a 
product of journalistic imagination than a social phenomenon, still 
constitute an attack on the integrity of the classifications that must be 
addressed. Such attacks require the administrators of the system as 
well as the courts to develop new doctrines of tax avoidance. 
Second, the allocation of tax burdens imposed by the multiple 
schedules is inherently arbitrary. Before 1969, the Code allocated . 
that burden logically, if not entirely satisfactorily. The pre-1948 rule 
attributed income to the individual responsible for its production. 
The income-splitting permitted by the 1948 amendment, while 
adopted for political reasons,61 was empirically justifiable. Tax spe-
cialists generally assume that spouses pool and divide family in-
come. 62 Although there are exceptions, that assumption probably 
represents the most accurate single model of family budgeting. By 
contrast, the existing allocation of the tax burden between single and 
married taxpayers lacks a foundation in either principle or fact. The 
Code generally takes differences in taxpaying capacity into account 
by adjusting the definition of the tax base to reflect those varying 
capacities. But implicit in the adoption of secondary mechanisms 
like the multiple rate schedules is the conclusion that material differ-
ences exist between the two classes of taxpayers that we cannot 
quantify with sufficient accuracy to adjust the tax base. 
The arbitrary nature of multiple rate schedules has produced sev-
eral undesirable consequences. 63 Perhaps most importantly, it has 
59. Attempted, in the first instance, in I.R.C. § 2 (amended 1975 and 1976). 
60. See Richmond, The Marriage Penalty: Restructuring Federal Law to Remedy Tax Bur-
dens on Married Couples, 5 Nov A L.J. 31 (1980). 
61. See Bittker, supra note 48, at 1412-14. 
62. See H. GROVES, supra note 48, at 69-70; McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Personal 
Income T:ax: Prolegomena to Future .Discussion, 58 N.C. L. REV. 469,469 (1980). That is not 
to say, however, that all theorists agree that such an expenditure pattern justifies a tax allow-
ance forrthe married taxpayer such as income splitting. See, e.g., Pechman, Income Splitting, 
. in Ho USE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 
473, 479-81 (Comm. Print 1959) (arguing for a return to the pre-1948 system). 
63. Not only has the structure been endlessly criticized, but it has also prompted countless 
proposed amendments. For summaries of recent proposals, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess., THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PER-
SONS (Comm. Print 1980); Moerschbaecher, The Marriage Penalty and the .Divorce Bonus: A 
Comparative Examination of the Cullent Legislative Tax Proposals, 5 REV. TAX. INDIVIDUALS 
133 (1981); Richmond, supra note 60, at 45-52. 
Moreover, in the absence of a rational basis for the Code's discrimination, the debate over 
the allocation of the burden of taxation has focused excessively on emotional issues. See gener-
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significantly impaired the integrity of the tax system. Undoubtedly, 
the decline in taxpayers' respect for tax laws is attributable in part to 
the apparent unfairness of an arbitrary levy. In the absence of any 
sound justification for the differential in tax liabilities imposed by 
the multiple rate structure, taxpayers have begun to resort to self-
help to mitigate what they view as unacceptable inequities.64 No al-
ternative to the multiple rate structure will silence the complaints of 
those who appear more harshly treated by a system of taxation. But 
if harsher treatment is dictated by a good faith effort to apply ra-
tional criteria, it is reasonable to expect that treatment to be more 
broadly accepted than the essentially arbitrary multiple rate sched-
ules.65 
Taxpayers are entitled to a system of taxation that allocates tax 
burdens as equitably as possible. The existing multiple rate sched-
ules do not represent a good faith effort to achieve that fairness; they 
are a means of avoiding the necessity for producing an equitable 
allocation. It would, I think, be morally preferable to establish a 
differential in tax liabilities based upon an empirically derived 
formula that was doomed from the beginning to imprecision than to 
perpetuate the arbitrariness of the existing system. 
3. Feasibility of Sole Reliance upon Taxable Income 
Congress could eliminate the multiple rate schedules if there 
were no differences in circumstances between single and married 
taxpayers that the taxing system should take into account, or if such 
differences were sufficiently susceptible to accurate measurement 
that compensating adjustments could be made through the definition 
of taxable income. Either conclusion would require the prior identi-
fication of the differences in circumstance that are alleged to exist. 
Although there is substantial disagreement over the magnitude of 
those differences and whether they can be quantified, there is a gen-
ally Mess, For Richer, For Poorer: Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 CATH. U. L. Rev. 87 
(1978). For an extreme example, see Co=ent, Congressional Sanction of Illicit Cohabitation 
-The Tax Reform Act of 1969, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 940 (1979). The energies of those who 
would reform the system have not been directed toward obtaining a more equitable result, but 
rather toward achieving a politically expedient result. If the differential in tax liabilities were 
empirically based, the debate could be more productively channeled. Thus, the relative tax 
burden which is exclusively a question of household economics, might be addressed in eco-
nO,!IllC terms rather than in terms of extraneous social and political issues. 
64. See Richmond, supra note 60, at 31 n.2. 
65. One recent co=entator has asserted with some justice that "much of the unhappiness 
of the taxpaying public with current law stems from the fact that the present twenty percent 
formula for relating the Single and Joint Return rate schedules has no support whatsoever in 
any theory of an ideal income tax but is simply an ad hoc compromise." McIntyre & Oldman, 
supra note 51, at 1595. 
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eral consensus concerning their nature. 66 
In a traditional family, where only one spouse earns income, 
there are two possible grounds for distinguishing a married couple 
from two single persons who each earn one half of the amount of the 
couple's income.67 Both arguments suggest that married couples 
should incur greater tax liabilities. First, the self-performed services 
of the unemployed spouse may increase the couple's capacity to con-
sume at any level of income. Since this imputed income is not taxed, 
the equal attribution rule undertaxes married couples. This argu-
ment, of course, does not justify a differential in tax burden between 
all single taxpayers and all married couples, but only between em-
ployed single taxpayers and one-worker married couples. The argu-
ment also justifies a differential in tax liability between employed 
and unemployed single taxpayers. Thus, the imputed income argu-
ment is both overinclusive and underinclusive, and adjusting tax lia-
bilities to account for self-performed services could create greater 
inequities than it resolves. Moreover, the Code's failure to tax im-
puted income is a well-known defect of extensive proportions. That 
omission should be approached from a broader perspective than the 
relatively narrow question of the relative tax liabilities of single and 
married taxpayers. The Code has suffered enough from ad hoc 
amendments that ignore broader implications.68 
Although I reject imputed income as a general basis for subject-
ing married couples to a greater tax, the argument does have some 
merit. Many married couples benefit financially from the services of 
the unemployed spouse, particularly when the taxpayer must care 
for minor dependents. Because the more pronounced discrimination 
is an aspect of dependency, the question of imputed income will be 
treated in that context below.69 
The second principal argument supporting a heavier tax liability 
for married couples relies upon their economies of scale. But it is 
doubtful that many families achieve such economies in the sense of 
an ability to purchase goods in larger quantities at a lower unit price. 
Where these economies do exist, they reflect income level and per-
sonal traits more than essential differences between married and sin-
gle taxpayers. On the other hand, the benefit that each spouse 
66. R. GOODE, supra note 13, at 230; Bittker, supra note 48, at 1419-28. 
67. The present discussion assumes that the two single persons live apart. The problem of 
unmarried cohabitation is treated below. See text at notes 84-87 infra. 
68. F9r an illustration in another context, see Coven, Liabilities in Excess oj' Basis: Focht, 
Section 357(c)(3) and the Assignment oj' Income, 58 OR. L. REv. 61 (1979). 
69. See notes 80-83 infra and accompanying text. 
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obtains from the income of the other is an economy of scale that 
reveals such an essential difference. 
The theoretical base upon which an income tax is imposed is the 
sum of an individual's annual consumption plus accumulation of 
wealth. Because it is impractical to measure consumption directly, 
the tax actually is imposed upon financial receipts less production 
costs. For an individual, net receipts serve as a satisfactory proxy for 
consumption plus accumulation. If the deductibility of expenditures 
for the production of net receipts is properly limited, such receipts 
must equal the individual's consumption plus accumulation - at 
least if the deflection of that income to another person is regarded as 
consumption by the taxpayer and not by the donee. However, when 
a closely knit economic unit, such as a married couple, derives the 
financial receipt, the assumed equivalence between consumption and 
receipts is no longer valid because the receipt to some extent pro-
vides consumption for both husband and wife. Such dual consump-
tion exists when a single purchase benefits both spouses and the 
benefit derived by one spouse does not impair the benefit derived by 
the other. And to the extent of that dual consumption, a rule attrib-
uting the family income equally to both spouses understates their 
taxpaying capacity relative to single taxpayers. 
Thus, for example, the purchase of a waffle iron by one spouse 
benefits both equally, and the dual use will not materially reduce the 
benefit obtained by either.70 In essence, the income spent to 
purchase that waffle iron provides consumption to both husband and 
wife in the full amount of the iron's cost. By contrast, two single 
persons living apart must spend twice that amount to obtain the 
same measure of consumption. The married couple can use the in-
come not devoted to the purchase of a second waffle iron for other 
purposes. Accordingly, they can purchase a greater measure of con-
sumption, at a given level of income, than can two single individuals. 
It may be objected that one spouse may not like waffles, or, if 
given an unfettered choice, would have purchased a blender instead. 
But the taxation of forced consumption is an unavoidable aspect of 
the taxation of any family unit that pools financial resources. In-
70. If the useful life of a waffle iron were a direct function of the number of waffles it 
produced, the statement in the text would be in error, for the benefit derived by one spouse 
would reduce the benefit that could be obtained by the other. The useful life of consumer 
appliances, however, is a function of a variety of variables ranging from the care that it re-
ceives, to the changing tastes of its owners, to just plain luck, and the number of waffles pro-
duced is a minor element in the equation. Still, as observed below, the quantity of dual 
consumption attributed to such appliances properly should be something less than the entire 
cost of the article. 
August 1981) Taxable Income 1543 
come devoted by one member of the unit to purely private consump-
tion reduces the income available for the other, but nevertheless is 
fully taxed. If all household consumption provided purely private 
benefit for only husband or wife, and the couple divided its income 
equally, then the pre-1970 equal attribution rule would be precisely 
correct. But this is not the case. My suggestion is that a married 
couple's dual consumption has sufficient magnitude to be taken into 
account by the taxing system. 
If the analysis of the relative economic positions of single ap.d 
married taxpayers is correct, it follows that the tax imposed upon a 
married couple should exceed the combined tax imposed upon two 
single persons with relatively equal incomes that total the couple's 
income. This tax differential is justified primarily by differences in 
the consumptive capacities of married and single taxpayers. Because 
the market value of consumption is an ingredient of an ideal income 
tax base, greater consumption by married taxpayers should be re-
flected by adjusting the definition of their tax base - taxable in-
come. Secondary allocation mechanisms, such as the multiple rate 
schedules, are plainly second-best solutions. 
Other commentators have observed that dual consumption is a 
benefit of marriage,71 but have not relied upon this benefit to justify 
the differential in tax burdens between single and married taxpayers 
because it was thought too difficult to quantify accurately.72 This 
rejection, however, reduces the available options to the twin evils of 
arbitrary approximation by multiple rate schedules or the inequita-
ble disregard of real differences· in consumptive capacity. Perhaps 
those commentators who question the feasibility of quantifying dual 
consumption have set their standards too high. Admittedly, the most 
careful attempt to measure the financial consequences of marriage 
will fall far short of mathematical accuracy. The diversity of human 
conduct precludes complete success in this endeavor. However, even 
an imperfect quantification of dual consumption would permit spe-
cific adjustments to taxable income that allocate tax liability more 
equitably than do the multiple rate schedules. 
Assuming that the differences in financial circumstances between 
married and single taxpayers consist primarily of dual consumption, 
it is entirely feasible to measure those differences empirically. 
Plainly it would be impractical to require individual taxpayers to 
report specific instances of dual consumption. But an adjustment 
71. Bittker, supra note 48, at 1422. 
72. Bittker, supra note 48, at 1422-28; McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 51, at 1595-96 n.80. 
1544 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:1525 
could be based upon a representative portrayal of family budgeting 
-just as the assumption that families pooled their income underlay 
the 1948 equal attribution rule. Substantial data are presently avail-
able about the expenditure patterns of American families at different 
levels of income.73 Although much of the existing data concerns the 
lower portion of the income spectrum, inadequacies in the existing 
data base could be remedied. Indeed, the principal difficulty in 
quantifying dual consumption lies not in identifying how the typical 
family spends its incomes, but in making the judgments necessary to 
determine whether those expenditures support dual consumption. 
Those judgments, however, will not be as subjective as one might 
think. Promptly consumed goods and services - such as food, 
clothing, and travel - generally do not benefit both spouses. On the 
other hand, most consumer durables - such as kitchen appliances 
and household furnishings - do provide dual benefits. Housing it-
self is more difficult to characterize. Since each adult probably re-
quires some minimum private living space, there may be a little dual 
consumption until the couple has purchased some sufficient level of 
housing. But sharing a twelve-room single family dwelling should 
not curtail either spouse's benefit, and thus exemplifies dual con-
sumption. 
The accumulation of wealth, the other component of an income 
tax base, may also provide dual benefits, albeit difficult to measure. 
For many, savings are a form of insurance, a hedge against possible 
illness or injury. Until one spouse devotes those savings to private 
consumption, they provide a measure of security for both the hus-
band and wife. 
Even the wholly untailored data presently available provide a 
basis for making reasonable judgments concerning the extent of dual 
consumption in typical family budgets at various levels of income. 
The purchase of consumer durables is the primary, and most readily 
quantifiable, source of dual consumption. Expenditure studies sug-
gest that the typical American family spends between five and fifteen 
percent of its pretax family income on such goods.74 These studies 
also permit rough estimates of the value of dual consumption of 
housing by married couples. Although the data must be further re-
73. Most of this information is compiled by or for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See, e.g., 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 327 (1975); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB• 
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 442 (1980); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF 
LABOR, BULL. No. 1997, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY (1978) [hereinafter cited as CON· 
SUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY]. 
14. See CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, supra note 73. 
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fined, it is reasonable to assume that ten percent of family income 
supports dual consumption. 
That assumption could provide a basis for allocating the burden 
of taxation between married and single taxpayers through a specific 
adjustment to the definition of taxable income. Specifically, each 
spouse's taxable income would be deemed to equal fifty-five percent 
of the entire family income. Thus, a married couple whose taxable 
income under present law is $40,000 would have the same tax liabil-
ity, subject to the further adjustment for two-worker families sug-
gested below, as the combined tax on two single taxpayers, each of 
whom earned $22,000. Because this adjustment is empirically based, 
it would be considerably more accurate than the arbitrary allocation 
under the multiple rate schedules. Moreover, the very fact of a good 
faith effort to allocate the burden of taxation fairly rather than arbi-
trarily would materially improve the respectability of the taxing sys-
tem. 
The current sensitivities to the so-called marriage penalty make it 
politically difficult to implement an adjustment to taxable income by 
an addition to married couple's income - even if the adjustment 
were empirically based. Incorporating the adjustment into a sepa-
rate rate schedule has precedent in the post-1948 law, but this would 
tend to obscure the factual basis of the adjustment. A more com-
plete break with the arbitrariness of the existing schedules is prefera-
ble, and there may be a politically acceptable approach. Instead of 
increasing taxable income upon marriage, we could produce the 
same allocation of the tax burden by extending a deduction to single 
taxpayers. Although this solution is less direct than adjusting a mar-
ried couple's taxable income upward, it is an appropriate adjustment 
to taxable income nonetheless and avoids the problems of secondary 
allocation mechanisms. Combining a deduction for singles with the 
repeal of the head-of-household rate schedule and a new allowance 
for two-worker families, both suggested below, might well produce a 
politically acceptable package.75 
75. The willingness and ability of Congress to pursue the factual investigation and evalua-
tion required to implement the approach suggested in the text is evidenced by the recent 
amendments to those Code provisions that partially exclude from tax income earned abroad. 
Prior to 1976, certain United States taxpayers working abroad were entitled to a lump sum 
exclusion from tax of a portion of their foreign source earnings that ranged up to $25,000. For 
a history of that exclusion and of the amendments thereto, see Postlewaite & Stem, Innocents 
Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case far its Repeal, 65 VA. L. REv. 1093 
(1979). In that year, however, the House Ways and Means Committee determined that the 
arbitrary exclusion was inappropriate and should be repealed. In its place, the Committee 
reco=ended specific deductions designed to reflect the increased costs of living abroad to the 
extent that such increased costs were in fact encountered. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, supra note 
44, at 200-01. While the House proposal was not enacted in 1976, the substance of the propo-
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4. The Special Problem of the Two-Worker Household 
The principal criticism of the pre-1982 allocation of tax liability 
between married and single taxpayers is that tax liability increases 
upon the marriage of two single persons with relatively equal in-
comes.76 This so-called marriage penalty has two separate aspects: 
the fairness of that increase in tax liability, and ability of taxpayers 
to avoid the increase by remaining single. The fairness of the mar-
riage penalty is solely a question of the adequacy of the definition of 
taxable income. Tax avoidance, of course, poses other considera-
tions. But if taxpayers are confident that the existing tax differentials 
are fair, the problem of avoidance may well become less acute. 
Fairness requires that the tax imposed upon a married couple 
earning $40,000 be greater than the combined tax imposed upon two 
single taxpayers who each earn $20,000, to account for dual con-
sumption. Present law imposes such a pattern of taxation when one 
spouse generates all of a couple's income. However, when both 
spouses are employed, this result has been widely criticized because 
the couple's tax liability is greater than if they were single. This criti-
cism is groundless. The source of a family's income will not materi-
ally affect the allocation of consumption within the family. There is 
thus no rational basis in notions of distributional equity for imposing 
a lower tax upon a two-worker family than is imposed upon a one-
worker family. Indeed, any such reduction would conflict with the 
generally accepted principle that all married couples with the same 
family income should incur the same tax liability.77 
This necessity for equal treatment in an ideal income tax, how-
sal with a detailed and expanded series of deductions was enacted two years later. Foreign 
Earned Income Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-615, §§ 202-03, 92 Stat. 3097. The resulting I.R.C. 
§ 913 was short lived; its tailored allowances were repealed just three years later. Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § I 12(a), 95 Stat.-. That reversal of policy was 
attributable to the overwhelming objective of the 1981 legislation to assist American business 
and does not suggest that the 1978 approach was unworkable. See S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 34-38 (1981). In any event, the adjustment to taxable income proposed herein 
would be far simpler than the rather complex I.R.C. § 913 since the several bases for adjust-
ment would be distilled into a single addition to taxable income. 
76. For a clear tabular demonstration of the marriage penalty on different levels of income 
before 1982, see Brazer, Income Tax Treatment of the Family, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXA-
TION 245-46 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980). 
77. The marriage penalty would be eliminated if each individual were subject to tax on his 
own individual income, as occurred prior to 1948. Individual filing would, of course, violate 
the principle of equal taxation of equal income couples. Some commentators have been will-
ing to accept the sacrifice of that principle in order to eliminate the marriage penalty. See, e.g., 
Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual under the Federal Personal Income Tax, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 278 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980). The individual filing rule 
thus is one of the least appealing solutions to the marriage penalty. See McIntyre, supra note 
62. 
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ever, does not demonstrate that the present allocation of tax liability 
between one- and two-worker families is equitable. Equality of tax 
liability should be premised upon equality of taxable incomes. Pres-
ent law overtaxes two-worker families relative to one-worker fami-
lies because of traditional imperfections in the definition of taxable 
income. By correcting this definition and revising the differential in 
tax burdens generally imposed upon married couples, we could sub-
stantially reduce the marriage penalty. Indeed, those modifications 
would eliminate the unfairness contained in existing law. Although 
two-worker married coupl~s would still pay higher taxes than two 
singles with the same aggregate income, that differential would 
merely reflect the improvement in consumptive capacity attributable 
to the formation of an economic unit. 
The definitional defect that significantly affects two-worker 
couples is the failure of the Code's definition of taxable income to 
account for the costs of employment. Virtually all employed persons 
incur many costs solely because they are employed. Workers incur 
greater costs for clothing and meals, require briefcases or lunch-
boxes, and sacrifice a substantial amount of leisure time in which 
they could have substituted self-performed services for purchased 
services. Uniformly, however, the tax laws do not compensate work-
ers for these added expenses; the costs of being an employed person 
are not deductible.78 That imperfection in the taxing system does 
not create a greater inequity than can be justified by considerations 
of simplicity because the necessary costs of being employed, as dis-
tinguished from the volitional costs (f. e. , expensive suits, lunches, 
long commutes from the suburbs, leather briefcases), are relatively 
evenly distributed over the employed population. In effect, the tax-
ing system accounts for the necessary costs of one employed person • 
in the rate of tax imposed upon each taxable income.79 
Ignoring these costs does not discriminate between married and 
single taxpayers, or between a one-worker married couple and two 
employed single persons with a combined income equal to that of 
the couple. In each instance, nondeductibility of one individual's 
employment expenses produces uniform treatment. But ignoring 
those costs discriminates between one- and two-worker families. If 
both spouses are employed, the level of necessary employment costs 
rises and the rate schedule does not account for that increase in costs. 
Since the increase is not evenly distributed over the taxpaying popu-
78. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 32, at 90-91. 
19. Id 
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lation, we cannot ignore it without discriminating against two-
worker families. 
The system of taxation should redress this discrimination by 
redefining taxable income rather than through secondary mecha-
nisms. Because the discrimination is founded upon an overstate-
ment of the taxable income of two-worker families, the remedy lies 
in deflating that overstatement by granting a deduction for the in-
creased costs. The most accurate approach, of course, would be to 
permit the itemized deduction of these expenses. However, because 
many returns are involved and the additional expenses are relatively 
minor, simplicity and administrative convenience would likely sug-
gest that we use a fixed allowance or standard deduction. The 
amount of this allowance should be empirically determined, but 
should not exceed the net income of the spouse with the lower in-
come.80 
It is vastly more difficult to adjust properly for the loss of the 
second spouse's self-performed services. Reducing the two-worker 
family's tax to compensate for the loss of the second worker's loss of 
services is equivalent to taxing the self-performed services of the 
nonworker in a one-worker family. Although an ideal income tax 
might contain such a levy, the conceptual and practical difficulties in 
quantifying the value of self-performed services are so great that 
such an adjustment to the tax base has never been seriously consid-
ered. 81 But it does not necessarily follow that we must accept the 
inequity of making no adjustment at all. Indeed, the Code currently 
allows a limited tax credit for household and dependent care ex-
penses necessitated by employment, even though the services 
purchased merely substitute for self-performed services. 82 Specific 
80. For years beginning after 1981, precisely such an allowance has been adopted. Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103(a), 95 Stat. - (adding I.R.C. 
§ 221). After a one-year phase-in allowance, the new section grants a deduction in computing 
adjusted gross income on a joint return equal to 10% of the earned income of the lower paid 
spouse to a maximum of $3000. While that allowance is fully in accord with the observations 
in the text, the philosophy of the Senate Finance Committee, which proposed the reduction, is 
not entirely clear. Almost as an aside, the Committee Report cited the increased expenses of 
becoming employed and the loss of "free time" of the two-worker couple. The Committee's 
primary rationale appeared to be opposition to the marriage penalty itself for reasons unre-
lated to tax equity. Indeed, the Report stated that it was the goal of the Committee to elimi-
nate completely the penalty in future years. Thus the Committee seemed to regard the 
deduction it was proposing as introducing an inequitable distortion of taxable income that was 
necessary to preserve respect for the family and the tax system. S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1981). The suggestion here is that respect for the taxing system is best 
preserved by eliminating inequities. 
81. See R. GOODE, supra note 13, at 142-43; H. SIMONS, supra note 4, at 110-11; McIntyre 
& Oldman, supra note S1, at 1607-13. 
82. I.R.C. § 44A provides a credit against tax in an amount that ranges from 20% to 30% of 
specified household and dependent care expenses of certain employed persons. Prior to 1976, 
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deductions or credits may be imperfect substitutes for directly taxing 
the imputed value of services, but they are the only practical means 
of compensating two-worker families for this increased cost. The ex-
isting credit is merely a relatively inequitable form of tax relief to 
low-income households, and does not serve this purpose.83 How-
ever, an expanded allowance, in the form of a deduction for a rea-
sonable increase in the cost of purchased services, could. 
The modifications of the definition of taxable income proposed 
here can best be illustrated graphically. The following chart com-
pares the tax rate for married individuals at different taxable income 
levels under present law and as proposed with the tax rate presently 
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this allowance was an itemized deduction under the now repealed I.R.C. § 214. In that year 
the allowance was converted to a credit so that it could be claimed by taxpayers not itemizing 
their deductions. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, supra note 44, at 146-47. 
83. Prior to 1975, the child care deduction was phased out for taxpayers earning over 
$18,000 and disappeared entirely at $27,600. These ceilings were briefly raised, but in 1976, 
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In the computations that underlie the chart, the tax presently 
paid by a married individual equals one half of the tax payable 
under the joint return schedule on twice the income indicated in the 
chart. The chart discloses that, under present law, the percentage 
increase in a married individual's over a single person's tax on the 
same income varies quite widely. At both quite low and high levels 
of taxable income, a married individual pays little additional tax. 
But in the middle-income range, the income tax consequences of 
marriage become burdensome. This confirms the arbitrariness of the 
multiple rate schedules, for there is no obvious reason why married 
individuals' relative tax burdens should vary so widely at different 
levels of income. 
The proposed tax for a married individual from a one-worker 
household equals the tax that would be payable by a single person 
with 110% of the level of taxable income indicated on the chart. The 
resulting relative tax burden imposed on a married taxpayer would 
at some levels of income be greater and at other levels be less than 
under present law. However, quite desirably, the magnitude of the 
differential in tax is considerably more constant than under present 
law, reflecting the greater rationality of the proposed adjustment. 
Finally, the chart shows the proposed tax liability for a married 
individual in a two-worker family if the two-worker family allow-
ance were permitted. For illustrative purposes, the allowance equals 
ten percent of the first $10,000 of net income earned by the second 
working spouse plus five percent of any additional income of that 
spouse to a maximum allowable deduction of $3000. The relative 
tax burden was computed by subtracting one half of that allowance 
from 110% of the taxable income indicated on the chart. This com-
parison shows the effect of my proposals on the existing marriage 
penalty, for that "penalty" affects only households in which both 
spouses have substantial income. The assumed allowance reduces 
the additional tax paid by two-worker families at the middle income 
levels by approximately one half. However, at very high levels of 
the allowance was converted to a 20% credit. As such, the allowance provides a full tax benefit 
for the actual costs incurred only to taxpayers in the 20% marginal bracket, which is surpassed 
under present law by a taxable income of $11,900 reported on a joint return. For other taxpay-
ers, the tax benefit of a credit is equal to the ratio of the rate of credit to the taxpayer's margi-
nal bracket rate. Thus a taxpayer in the 50% bracket obtains only 40% of the tax benefit from a 
20% credit as would be obtained from a deduction. Somewhat oddly, a taxpayer having a 
marginal rate below 20% is subsidized by the credit. See R. GoooE, supra note 13, at 155-56. 
Beginning in 1982, the low-income subsidizing aspect of the child care credit will be enhanced 
considerably. The credit has been increased to 30% of allowable expenditures for taxpayers 
having adjusted gross incomes of $10,000 or less although such taxpayers will generally be 
subject to a marginal tax rate of only 14 to 16%. The allowable credit declines to 20% for those 
with adjusted gross ~comes of $30,000 or more. 
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income, where the combined family net income exceeds $110,000, 
the amount of additional tax imposed increases. 
Granting a special allowance to two-worker households would 
eliminate the existing inequity between one-worker and two-worker 
families, and thus should reduce the tax avoidance precipitated by 
the marriage penalty. 84 But tax avoidance through divorce or failure 
to marry is only part of a larger problem, which neither present law 
nor a simple adjustment to the definition of taxable income can 
solve. I have suggested that economic units benefit from pooling 
their members' financial resources to an extent that the taxing system 
cannot ignore. If that is so, the benefit is not limited to married 
couples, but rather accrues to all couples or even larger groups that 
engage in similar financial conduct. On the other hand, not all per-
sons who live in the same residence pool their resources to an extent 
that would justify the imposition of a greater tax liability. Indeed, it 
is unlikely that all married couples so pool their resources. 
Many commentators have noted the failure of the taxing system 
to address these economic realities, and concluded, no doubt cor-
rectly, that the definitional problem is insurmountable. 85 Lacking a 
better alternative, the federal tax system uses marriage as a proxy to 
define economic units that derive benefits from pooling financial re-
sources to an extent that the taxing system cannot ignore. Conceiv-
ably, over time, changing patterns of social behavior will so erode 
the perceived correlation between marriage and pooling that a new 
approach to the allocation of the burden of taxation between single 
persons and economic units will be required. But until tax liability is 
based upon taxpayers' actual economic circumstances rather than 
their marital status, the system will err in that allocation. And, since 
that formal status results from volitional conduct, the potential for 
taxpayer avoidance will continue to exist. 
Cohabitation by employed but unmarried couples of different 
sexes is only one aspect of this far larger problem, and likely repre-
sents only a minor fraction of the overall error in tax allocation. 
Proposals such as elective separate filing by married couples86 attack 
the undertaxation of a subclass of unmarried coinhabitants by inap-
propriately reducing the tax liability of a subclass of married taxpay-
84. Since two-worker families have in fact been unfairly taxed, it is not surprising that they 
have objected to that tax or that they have taken evasive action. Were those couples subject to 
tax in the manner suggested above, the amount of the tax would be lessened and the inequity 
substantially eliminated. There is no basis for supposing that in such an altered environment, 
tax avoidance by failing to marry would constitute a material concern. 
85. See Bittker, supra note 48, at 1398-99; Brazer, supra note 76, at 242-43. 
86. See Munnel, supra note 77, at 267-71. 
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ers. Such an approach would introduce a new inequity into the 
allocation of the burden of taxation without reducing the existing 
inequities. If tax avoidance by failing to marry requires attention 
beyond the elimination of the inequities of present law, that atten-
tion must be directed to the evolution of a workable definition of an 
economic unit that can entirely replace the proxy of marital status. 87 
5. The Special Problem of Dependency 
The adoption of the equal attribution rule in 1948 imposed a rel-
ative tax burden on single persons that was too great. That burden 
was felt heavily by those in the most pressing circumstances - sin-
gle-parent families. In response to their demands for relief, Con-
gress promulgated the head-of-household rate schedule. 88 It is 
doubtful that the adoption of a second rate schedule was ever a 
proper response to the :financial circumstances of single-parent fami-
lies. Regardless, in view of the 1969 adjustment to the relative tax 
liabilities of married and single taxpayers, and the adoption of the 
child care allowance, that erosion of the role of taxable income is 
completely unjustifiable. 
The analysis of the propriety of the head-of-household rate 
schedule should commence with an effort to identify specific 
:financial burdens encountered by single-parent families that distin-
guish those taxpayers from all others, and justify additional relief. 
Although several arguments favor single parents, in each instance 
the claim for special relief is either unwarranted or could be accom-
modated with far greater accuracy by adjusting the definition of tax-
able income rather than by a general rate reduction. 
a. Loss of self-services. An employed single parent may be 
forced to substitute purchased services for self-performed services, 
and thereby suffer a decline in volitional consumption. However, 
that :financial detriment does not materially differ from the addi-
tional costs incurred by a two-worker married couple. The proper 
approach to this aspect of dependency for both categories of taxpay-
87. Those who would arbitrarily reduce the tax liabilities of married couples in order to 
eliminate the marriage penalty have sought to justify their position by the need to preserve 
respect for the family and that argument has had its impact on Congress. The argument is 
frivolous. As long as a couple lives together as husband and wife, regardless of their formal 
status under state law, they are demonstrating their continued respect for the social institution 
of the family. By entering into a tax-motivated divorce (or failure to marry) while continuing 
to behave as if married, the couple is demonstrating its disrespect for the taxing system. It is 
impossible to understand how respect for the taxing system can be restored by eroding the 
equity of the system in order to ratify purely tax-avoidance conduct. 
88. I.R.C. § l(b). See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text. 
August 1981] Taxable Income 1553 
ers is to expand the existing allowance for child care and household 
expenses. That provision's inadequacy no more justifies a rate re-
duction for singles than it does a rate reduction for two-worker mar-
ried couples. 
b. Inadequacy of other dependency allowances. Providing for 
dependents unquestionably reduces the amount of income available 
to taxpayers for their own consumption. Although some commenta-
tors have suggested that the entire cost of dependents - or at least of 
minor children - is a pure consumption expense of the taxpayer, 89 
the present consensus favors some allowance for the forced channel-
ing of income to a dependent.90 The more difficult problem lies in 
distinguishing between volitional and forced consumption. Voli-
tional consumption - the indulgence of one's children - should be 
included in taxable income. But forced consumption - providing 
basic necessities - may justify a dependency allowance. The Code's 
solution is the personal exemption - a fixed, per capita deduction of 
$1000.91 
All taxpayers, of course, single and married, are entitled to the 
personal exemption for dependent children. If that exemption ade-
quately reflected forced deflection of income attributable to the sup-
port of dependents, further adjustments would be unnecessary. But 
to the extent that the $ 1000 exemption is inadequate, single taxpay-
ers bear the burden of that inadequacy more heavily than married 
taxpayers. Of course, a married couple as an economic unit suffers 
the same decline in consumption as a single taxpayer. But the 
couple can distribute that decline over both spouses, while the single 
taxpayer must bear the entire burden. Accordingly, an inadequate 
dependency exemption discriminates against single taxpayers. Con-
gress could remove that discrimination by generally increasing the 
allowance, or by permitting single taxpayers to deduct an amount 
equal to one half of the amount of the inadequacy. 
Although the measurement of that inadequacy, if an inadequacy 
exists, would be highly imprecise and subjective, the general tax re-
duction extended by the head-of-household rate schedule is a totally 
unacceptable substitute for attempting that measurement. Because 
the same rate reduction applies regardless of the number of depen-
dents, it constitutes a less accurate adjustment than would the 
89. Simons himself so suggested. H. SIMONS, supra note 4, at 140. 
90. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 48, at 1449-53; McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 51, at 
1602-07. 
91. I.R.C. § 151. 
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roughest guess concerning the inadequacy of the dependency allow-
ance. Moreover, the head-of-household schedule extends a pattern 
ofrelief that does not conform to the premise of the personal exemp-
tion. Under that schedule, the amount of the dependency allowance 
varies with the level of taxable income. This results in a dependency 
allowance arguably insufficient for lower-income taxpayers, but 
markedly excessive for wealthy taxpayers. The following table, 
which shows the tax payable under the rate schedules for single tax-
payers and heads of households assuming that each claimed three 
personal exemptions of $ 1000, illustrates the existing relationship: 
A B C D 
Taxable Head-of- Income Deduction 
Income Singles Rate Household Rate Equivalent Equivalent 
$ 15,000 $ 1,843 $ 1,756 $ 11,638 $ 362 
30,000 6,732 6,211 25,664 1,336 
60,000 22,053 20,603 54,611 2,389 
120,000 61,787 57,666 111,113 5,887 
Column C represents the amount of income before personal ex-
emptions required under the singles rate schedule to produce the 
amount of tax currently paid under the head-of-household schedule. 
By subtracting column C from the actual taxable income, the effect 
of the head-of-household rate schedule is converted into a deduc-
tion. That is, column D shows the amount of the deduction that an 
individual subject to the singles-rate schedule would need to limit his 
tax liability to that produced by the head-of-household schedule. 
Thus, if taxable income is $15,000, using the head-of-household rate 
schedule rather than the singles schedule saves the taxpayer $87 in 
tax, as would a deduction of $362 claimed by a taxpayer using the 
singles schedule. As income rises, so does the deduction equivalent 
of the head-of-household schedule. By contrast, the personal ex-
emption is not income sensitive, and remains at $ 1000 regardless of 
the level of taxable income. If single taxpayers should be compen-
sated for the discrimination that the inadequacy of the dependency 
allowance produces, the general configuration of that relief should 
conform to the configuration of the basic allowance. Thus, if the flat 
per capita personal exemption is appropriate, the head-of-household 
schedule is not. 
It might, of course, be contended that the pattern of relief ex-
tended by the head-of-household schedule is more equitable than 
that extended by the personal exemption because it more nearly re-
flects the amount of family income devoted to the support of depen-
dents. But that argument only suggests that Congress should change 
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the overall structure of the dependency allowance for both married 
and single taxpayers, and does not support the use of a multiple rate 
structure. 
c. .Different expenditure patterns. It may be that the typical pat-
tern of expenditures varies materially between single-parent families 
and married couples with dependents. In the form most favorable to 
the head-of-household rate schedule, it might be argued that such 
households deflect a fraction of the family income to the dependents 
instead ofto a second adult.92 Although this argument may be valid, 
it is similarly · probable that married couples deflect increasing 
amounts of their income to their dependents as family income rises. 
In both contexts, the question turns not on the amount of income 
deflected to the dependents but rather on how much of that deflec-
tion represents forced rather than volitional consumption. If the 
Code ignores the rising pattern of expenditures for married couples, 
it must also ignore it for single parents. 
In short, there is no special problem of dependency for single 
taxpayers. Although such taxpayers may equitably claim a larger 
dependency allowance than is granted to married couples, their 
claim does not extend beyond a relatively small per capita deduc-
tion. The head-of-household rate schedule is an unjustified erosion 
of the role of taxable income in allocating the burden of taxation. 
6. In Summary 
This section has delved rather deeply into the taxation of the 
family unit because the most significant use of secondary allocation 
mechanisms has occurred in that context. Although material differ-
ences in taxpaying capacity do exist among the several categories of 
taxpayers, the most accurate mechanism to compensate for these dif-
ferences is the concept of taxable income. Congress's unnecessary 
use of such secondary mechanisms as the multiple rate structure has 
produced less equitable results than would an adjustment to taxable 
income. Moreover, abandoning the more precise and defensible 
mechanism of taxable income has reduced confidence in the fairness 
of the taxing system. Both the distributional equity of the taxing 
system and public confidence in that system would be improved for 
the present and preserved for the future if Congress abandoned the 
multiple rate structure in favor of a system of specific adjustments to 
taxable income. 
92. This argument appears to underlie the original adoption of the head-of-household 
schedule. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. 
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B. The De Facto Repeal of Personal Deductions 
The preceding section traced the ad hoc adoption of a multiple 
rate structure in an effort to improve the taxing system's horizontal 
equity. By contrast, the gradual emergence of the zero bracket and 
the attendant disallowance of deductions for most personal expendi-
tures occurred for quite the opposite reason. The progressive elimi-
nation of the deductibility of these expenditures exemplified a 
conscious effort to subjugate distributional equity to competing 
objectives of tax policy. Thus the evolution of the zero bracket is 
both a cause of the declining role of taxable income and a reflection 
of that decline. 
1. Historical Evolution 
Congress first added a standard deduction to the Code in 194493 
as part of a series of amendments designed to achieve the "simplifi-
cation of the individual income tax."94 This inaugural provision per-
mitted taxpayers to elect a standard deduction of ten percent of 
adjusted gross income to a maximum of $500 instead of several indi-
vidually claimed deductions. Despite its relatively nominal impact, 
even this early provision partially tended to erode the equity of the 
income tax base. However, itemizing deductions involves certain 
costs and difficulties, and produces inaccuracies. An inequity is also 
created if individuals who are entitled to deductions are denied tax 
benefits because they failed to meet burdensome evidentiary require-
ments. If the standard deduction closely approximated the itemized 
deductions that most taxpayers would be entitled to claim, less dis-
tortion of tax burden would be introduced than would be eliminated. 
Thus, this simplification may have enhanced, rather than eroded, the 
overall equity of the income tax. 
Twenty years after adopting the first standard deduction, Con-
gress created the minimum standard deduction.95 This minimum 
deduction, which could be claimed if it exceeded the standard de-
duction, was related to family size rather than to income, and bore 
little relationship to the actual deductions that might otherwise have 
been claimed. Indeed, the purpose of the minimum deduction was 
not to simplify, but rather to relieve "persons at or near the subsis-
tence level of much or all of their tax liability."96 It was estimated 
93. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, § 9, 58 Stat. 236. 
94. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1944). 
95. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § I 12, 78 Stat. 19 (amending I.R.C. § 141). 
96. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, reprinted in (1964) U.S. CODE CoNo. & 
Ao. NEWS 1313, 1333. 
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that this provision alone would eliminate 1.5 million individuals 
from the tax rolls.97 
The inequity resulting from the decision to extend tax relief 
through the standard deduction is evident. A taxpayer with an ad-
justed gross income of $5000 could claim a standard deduction of 
$500. If he were married and had three children, his minimum de-
duction would be $700, even if his actual itemized deductions aggre-
gated less than $500. The five $600 personal exemptions available in 
1965 would reduce his taxable income to $1300. If medical expenses 
increased his itemized deductions to $700, his taxable income and his 
tax would remain unchanged. In fact, all taxpayers with the same 
number of dependents and with less than $700 in itemized deduc-
tions were subject to the same tax liability even though their income 
after deductible expenditures, and thus their capacity to consume, 
varied widely. In effect, the minimum standard deduction denied 
taxpayers the right to itemize deductions below a specified floor. 
Somewhat oddly, that floor was based solely on family size. 
Although the original standard deduction produced a similar re-
sult, there was a significant difference. The original standard deduc-
tion was designed to, and quite likely did, bear a reasonable 
relationship to the actual deductible expenditures of a broad class of 
taxpayers. The minimum deduction was not so designed. Accord-
ingly, the degree of inequity produced by the minimum deduction 
was materially greater than the inequity produced by the standard 
deduction. More importantly, Congress produced that inequity by 
design. 
The unfairness of the 1964 amendment is evident, but it is 
equally clear that the minimum deduction was not materially inequi-
table. The provision extended tax relief only to relatively low-in-
come taxpayers - over fifty percent of the benefit accrued to 
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes below $300098 - and its im-
pact was minimal. But the extension of tax relief through the stan-
dard deduction begun in 1964 paved the way for more substantial 
erosions, and the de minimis nature of the inequity did not long 
survive. Beginning with the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress pro-
gressively increased the minimum deduction.99 Moreover, for years 
beginning with 1971, the same Act eliminated any remaining rela-
tionship between the minimum deduction and a taxpayer's actual 
97. Id. at 24, [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 1333. 
98. Id. at 24, [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 1333. 
99. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 802, 83 Stat. 487. 
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expenditures by converting the allowance to a flat amount. By 1976, 
this fixed allowance reached $2100.100 At the same time, Congress 
increased the standard deduction to sixteen percent of adjusted gross 
income, to a maximum of $2800. 
In part, of course, these progressive increases merely kept pace 
with inflation, but inflation was not Congress's primary concern. 
The increases were primarily designed to provide tax relief to low-
income families. 101 Each increase removed numerous taxpayers 
from the tax rolls and substantially redu~ed other taxpayers' tax lia-
bility. For taxpayers entirely exempted from tax, no inequity re-
sulted because all such former taxpayers were treated equally. But 
many more taxpayers experienced a widening gap between their ide-
ally computed taxable incomes and their taxable incomes computed 
with the increased allowances. Each increase obliterated more sig-
nifi.cant distinctions among taxpayers, and progressively reduced the 
equitable distribution of taxation. 
Though Congress's primary concern may have been to provide 
tax relief for low-income families, in 1969 a second objective 
emerged. The preparation and audit of tax returns could be simpli-
fied by requiring more taxpayers to use the standardized allowance 
rather than to record their actual deductible expenditures.102 But the 
simplification sought by Congress in 1969 was significantly different 
from the new simplification sought by the introduction of the stan-
dard deduction in 1944. The original allowance was designed to 
eliminate unnecesssary specificity in claiming deductions, and was 
not fashioned to alter the incidence of taxation. Indeed, the 1944 
legislation may have enhanced distributional equity. 103 By contrast, 
the allowance provided in 1969 achieved simplification only by dis-
regarding substantial distinctions among taxpayers, thus frustrating 
an equitable distribution of the burden of taxation. 
These inflated standardized allowances prohibited many taxpay-
ers from claiming itemized deductions, and imposed the income tax, 
not on taxable income, but rather on. adjusted gross income - or, 
100. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 401, 90 Stat. 1520. 
101. The 1969 legislation, for example, was expressly designed to conform the level of 
income at which an income tax was first imposed to the nonfarm poverty level established by 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
258, reprinted in (1969] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2027, 2295. The merit of that objective 
is not questioned here; the means for achieving it, however, are. 
102. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1976) ("The increase in the standard 
deduction represents a major simplification of the tax law because it will encourage taxpayers 
who file over 9 million tax returns to switch from itemizing their deductions to using the stan-
dard deduction."). 
103. See text at notes 93-94 supra. 
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more precisely, on eighty-four percent of adjusted gross income. 
The extent of this shift in the tax base over the past decade is surpris-
ing. The 1969 legislation sought to permit an additional 11.8 million 
taxpayers to claim the standardized allowance.104 After the 1977 in-
crease, only twenty-five percent of all taxpayers were expected to 
itemize their deductions.105 
This erosion of the role of taxable income culminated in 1977 
with the adoption of the zero bracket amount. The zero bracket con-
cept fixes the allowance for all taxpayers, varying only with filing 
status. For example, all married couples filing joint returns now 
have an allowance of $3400. This revision eliminated the last ves-
tiges of any relationship between the standardized allowance and the 
actual level of deductions. Recognizing what had occurred, Con-
gress repealed the standard deduction and expressly prohibited 
claiming itemized deductions unless they exceed the _zero bracket 
amount.106 To avoid a simultaneous change in tax incidence, Con-
gress adjusted the rate structure so that no tax is imposed upon in-
come below $3400 on a joint return. However, there is no necessary 
relationship between this nondeductible amount and the size of the 
zero bracket. Should Congress desire to bar itemized deductions to 
an even greater proportion of the population it may increase the 
nondeductible amount. That change, of course, would increase the 
taxable incomes of all married taxpayers filing joint returns with 
itemized deductions in excess of $3400. But there is no necessary 
reason why Congress must offset that increase in tax by a corre-
sponding increase in the size of the zero bracket. 
2. Critique of the Zero .Bracket Amount 
Like the multiple rate structure, the zero bracket amount concept 
erodes the role of taxable income in the allocation of the burden of 
taxation. Since the multiple rate structure exists only to distribute 
tax liability fairly among classes of taxpayers, the superiority of the 
taxable income mechanism depends upon the feasibility of making a 
more accurate discrimination among those classes of taxpayers than 
is possible under the multiple rate structure. With respect to the zero 
bracket amount, however, no such factual doubts are present. The 
104. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 101, at 259, [1969) U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
2296. 
105. S. REP. No. 95-66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 50, reprinted in [1977) U.S. CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 185, 230. 
106. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 102, 91 Stat. 126 
(adding I.R.C. § 63(b)-(c)). 
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area of dispute involves the more fundamental question of the extent 
to which taxable income should be used in the allocation of tax lia-
bility. Although the use of the zero bracket amount concept in lieu 
of taxable income may be defended on three grounds, none is com-
pelling. 
a. Tax reduction. Granting tax relief to low-income taxpayers 
was one of Congress's principal objectives in both increasing the 
amount of the standardized allowance and in adopting the zero 
bracket amount. But there are more equitable ways to attain that 
result. 107 The zero bracket approach grants the greatest tax reduc-
tion to taxpayers for whom the standard allowance exceeds their ac-
tual deductible expenditures by the greatest amount. At each level 
of adjusted gross income, the greatest tax relief is extended to tax-
payers with the fewest actual expenses, while those with the largest 
expenses and the smallest income receive the least relief. Thus, 
within the class of benefitted taxpayers - those having actual deduc-
tions aggregating less than the zero bracket amount - the distribu-
tion of the tax relief is precisely contrary to the legislation's stated 
objective. Moreover, the standardized allowance provides no benefit 
at all to taxpayers whose actual expenditures exceed the allowance 
- even though their taxable incomes may be far smaller than the 
incomes of those benefitted by the provision. 
In short, the zero bracket approach, while extending tax relief to 
some low-income taxpayers, extends that relief in an irrational pat-
tern and is thus an unsuitable vehicle for accomplishing tax relief. 
The standardized allowance not only reduces the distributional eq-
uity of the taxing system, but it is also a technically inferior method 
of achieving its intended purpose. Since Congress has available to it 
a wide variety of other methods for granting tax relief (!.e., revisions 
of the rate structure or income sensitive deductions or credits), the 
use of the zero bracket amount to reach that result cannot be de-
fended. 
b. Simplification. Congress originally adopted the standard de-
duction to simplify the preparation of income tax returns. Although 
other objectives have dominated recent legislation, the desire to sim-
plify remains strong and undoubtedly has contributed to the expan-
107. Indeed, the possibilities are almost limitless: a reduction of the rates in the lower 
brackets, an increase in the personal exemptions, an additional deduction or credit related to 
income or family size or both. For example, Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 
203(a), 89 Stat. 26 (adding I.R.C. § 42), introduced a short-lived credit equal to the greater of 
$35 per dependent or 2% of taxable income up to $9000. 
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sion of the standardized allowance. But the zero bracket amount 
cannot be justified merely because it simplifies - no matter how 
worthy that objective. If simplification suffices to justify the elimina-
tion of any tax allowance, the income tax should be replaced with 
the simplest tax - a tax on gross receipts. Simplification, however, 
is not our sole objective. 
Since the primary role of a taxing system is to achieve distribu-
tional equity, the benefits of simplification must be weighed against 
the resulting loss in fairness. In this respect, it is important to distin-
guish between simplification achieved by removing an essentially 
technical requirement108 and simplification that alters the ultimate 
allocation of the burden of taxation. The former does not alter the 
equitable impact of the taxing system, but the latter plainly does. 
Through a series of barely perceptible steps, the original allowance 
has acquired a substantive impact that has not been adequately con-
sidered. 
On the one hand, the zero bracket amount has not significantly 
simplified the preparation of tax returns. The amount of most item-
ized deductions - including interest, 109 state taxes, 110 and casualty 
losses - is easily obtained and readily veripable. The medical ex-
pense deduction is likely the most difficult to compute, but the three 
percent floor on the medical expense deduction eliminates that de-
duction for taxpayers with only routine medical or dental costs. 111 
The standard allowance does eliminate the need to verify relatively 
small but numerous charitable contributions. Yet, somewhat ironi-
cally, there has been substantial pressure in Congress recently to re-
move charitable deductions from the category of deductions 
replaced by the standard allowance, and to permit the full deduct-
ibility of such expenditures.112 The additional categories of itemized 
108. An example would be eliminating the need to adopt a plan containing precise lan-
guage as a prerequisite to the issuance of a § 1244 stock, accomplished by the Revenue Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 345, 92 Stat. 2763. 
109. In this computerized era, all banks and national consumer credit card companies rou-
tinely provide this information at year-end. 
110. Actual state sales taxes paid are not so easily compiled, but the Internal Revenue 
Service provides a formula for computing an acceptable minimum sales tax deduction. 
111. 1.R.C. § 5213(a)(l). 
112. S. 170, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. S334 (daily ed. Jan 20, 1981). In the 
preceding year, an identical Senate bill obtained 42 cosponsors. Id. at S343 (statement of Sen. 
Moynihan). Indeed, a step in that direction was taken in the 1981 legislation. After 1981, 
taxpayers not itemizing their deductions will nevertheless be permitted a charitable contribu-
tions deduction. However, under an absurdly complex phase-in provision, the deduction al-
lowed cannot exceed $75 until 1984. The proV1Sion is scheduled to expire after 1986. 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. -. 
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deductions, such as certain employee business expenses113 and in-
vestment-related expenses, 114 are generally available only to rela-
tively sophisticated taxpayers. 
Moreover, continual record-keeping requirements undercut po-
tential simplification benefits. Not all taxpayers can predict at the 
beginning of the taxable year whether their total expenditures for 
which itemized deductions may be claimed will exceed the zero 
bracket amount at the end of the year. If individuals wish to mini-
mize their tax liabilities, they must retain records of their expendi-
tures and perhaps make a trial computation before they can 
determine whether they are eligible to itemize their deductions. 
Clearly, the zero bracket amount does not accomplish a simplifica-
tion for these taxpayers. 
This rather modest simplification must be balanced against sub-
stantial inequity. The level of the zero bracket amount was designed 
to prevent three quarters of the taxpaying population from itemizing 
deductions. For those taxpayers, the tax laws ignore distinctions in 
taxpaying capacity based upon personal misfortune and widely vary-
ing levels of state and local taxation, and represents a substantial 
retreat from the equitable fine tuning of the taxing system that in-
spired those allowances. 
It is particularly significant that the zero bracket amount concept 
primarily affects the low-income taxpayers. The net effect of the al-
lowance is to authorize only relatively wealthy taxpayers to itemize 
deductions. If the nondeductible zero bracket amount remains no 
greater than the rate schedule zero bracket, the Code's vertical equity 
is unimpaired by so limiting itemized deductions; only horizontal eq-
uity is affected. Nevertheless, low-income taxpayers are as entitled 
as wealthy taxpayers to be distinguished from their peers. Granting 
that privilege only to the rich must breed disrespect for the fairness 
of the taxing system. 
Identifying the proper balance between simplification and equity 
in tax legislation is a highly subjective matter. Although others may 
dispute this conclusion, it appears that the present zero bracket 
113. Expenses deductible under I.R.C. § 162 but not allowable under I.R.C. § 62 in com-
puting adjusted gross income such as union dues. 
114. 1.R.C. § 212. In any event, the continued classification of such expenses as personal 
or itemized deductions is improper. In its reconstruction of expanded income for comparative 
purposes, the Treasury uses adjusted gross income (expanded by the amount of tax prefer-
ences) less investment related expenses. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEPT, OF THE 
TREASURY, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1976, INDMDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 198 (1979). 
Accordingly, it is particularly improper to disallow deductions for such expenses through the 
zero bracket amount device. 
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amount creates a greater loss of distributional equity than is offset by 
the gains of simplification. 115 An allowance tailored to the actual 
level of itemized deductions claimed by a substantial number of tax-
payers at different levels of income would be a justifiable compro-
mise with a rigorous definition of taxable income, but the present 
allowance is not. 
c. Superiority of adjusted gross income. One suspects that Con-
gress would not have imposed the distributional inequity inherent in 
an inflated standardized allowance unless it believed that adjusted 
gross income measures taxpaying capacity as well as does taxable 
income, or that most itemized deductions were inappropriate. There 
is a substantial basis for dissenting from that view. 116 And even ac-
cepting the superiority of adjusted gross income does not justify· a 
dual tax base. If adjusted gross income is preferable for some _tax-
payers, it must be preferable for all. 
The gradual adoption of an inflated standardized allowance rep-
resents a shift from full deductibility of specified personal expendi-
tures to the deductibility of only extraordinary expenditures. So 
limiting the deductibility of certain itemized deductions, such as in-
vestment-related expenditures, is clearly inappropriate. But even if 
the objective were reasonable, the zero bracket amount fails to ap-
proximate extraordinary expenditures. The zero bracket amount de-
fines "extraordinary" in absolute terms. Accordingly, for some 
taxpayers, personal expenditures must consume the bulk of their ad-
justed gross income to be deductible. For other taxpayers, those ex-
penditures become deductible even though they represent only a 
minor fraction of adjusted gross income. 
Furthermore, the arbitrariness of the zero bracket amount con-
cept may produce, like the multiple rate structure, complex and irra-
tional offspring. The zero bracket amount concept conflicts with 
Congress's desire to' grant specific deductions to achieve distribu-
tional equity or nontax objectives. To prevent the dilution of the 
desired tax benefit, Congress has in the past recl~ssified itemized de-
ductions as deductions from gross income. 117 There is presently 
115. Those who question the propriety of the allowance of most personal deductions will, 
of course, discount the loss of distributional equity. The Musgraves, for example, suggest that 
the standard allowance improves the horizontal equity of the Code by muting the inequities of 
the personal deductions. They acknowledge, however, that the better approach would be to 
eliminate the deductions they find objectionable. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 
l, at 245. This defense of the zero bracket amount is addressed in the next section. 
116. See notes 22-29 supra and accompanying text. 
117. The deduction permitted by I.R.C. § 215 for alimony paid was so altered by the Tax 
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pending a bill that would similarly recast the charitable contribu-
tibns deduction.us Expenses deductible under section 212 also 
might be favored. 119 The taxing system will become increasingly ir-
rational as Congress makes more such adjustments. Surely a return 
to a viable definition of taxable income would be preferable to such 
nonproductive tinkering. 
C. Limitations on Tax Preferences 
Although the zero bracket amount concept primarily affects 
lower-income taxpayers, limitations on tax preferences primarily af-
fect wealthy taxpayers. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress 
has repeatedly addressed the tax reduction produced by conscious 
tax shelters and by excessive use of the Code's economic incentives. 
The enacted results of this extended consideration flagrantly disre-
gard the taxable income mechanism. In the decade beginning in 
1969, at least one house of Congress passed no fewer than six pro-
posals for reducing the abuse of tax incentive provisions. Three of 
those proposals were related to the computation of taxable income, 
and three eroded the taxable income mechanism. Each proposal 
that was compatible with the taxable income concept was passed by 
the House but rejected by the Senate; each erosive proposal was en-
acted. 
Circumventing taxable income to attack tax preferences is re-
markable since the very evil addressed is the excessive distortion of 
taxable income. Tax incentive provisions exist to create inequities. 
Congress seeks to stimulate targeted activities by increasing their af-
ter-tax profitability. If the incentive is successful, a taxpayer re-
sponding to the incentive will pay less tax than similarly situated 
taxpayers who do not respond to the incentive. There are, however, 
limitations on the tax reduction that Congress will accept as the cost 
of its economic interventionism. To some extent, the benefits of tax 
incentives may have been claimed by taxpayers who only pretended 
to engage in the desired activity. For example, Manhattan doctors 
drilling dry holes in Oklahoma do not relieve the oil shortage. Per-
haps more importantly, some taxpayers used a variety of tax incen-
tives to reduce their taxable incomes to levels too far below their 
ideal taxable incomes - calculated in the absence of the incentive 
provisions - to be tolerated. The need to design limitations that 
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 502j(a), 90 Stat. 1520. Similarly, the child care 
allowance was converted from an itemized deduction to a credit. See note 83 supra. 
118. See note 112supra. 
119. See note 114supra. 
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would not destroy the incentives that Congress wished to extend 
complicated the attack on the perceived abuses. Nevertheless, the 
general form that such limitations must take would seem obvious. 
Because the vice is the excessive depression of taxable income, the 
remedy should be its limited restoration. 
I. The Enacted Provisions 
In 1969, Congress adopted a tax on items of tax preference.120 As 
it was subsequently amended, this preference tax consisted of a fiat 
fifteen percent excise-type on the sum of a specified list of prefer-
ences reduced by one half of the taxpayer's regular federal income 
tax. The Senate's stated purpose in proposing the preference tax was 
to ensure that all individuals with high ideal taxable incomes paid at 
least some income tax. Whether that tax bore any defensible rela-
tionship to either the amount of ideal income or the relative amount 
of the preferences claimed evidently was not important. It is thus 
not surprising that the distributional consequences of the preference 
tax, as modified over the years, have been both regressive and argua-
bly irrational.121 These unsatisfactory consequences stem primarily 
from the decision to impose a penalty under a separate fiat rate 
schedule, thereby distributing the penalty in a pattern inconsistent 
with the general distribution of the tax burden. 
The regressive character of the preference tax was most pro-
nounced before 1978, when the tax applied to the exclusion from tax 
of fifty percent of capital gains. Assuming that the preference tax 
was otherwise payable because additional preferences had exhausted 
the exemption, the effective preference tax rate on additional capital 
gains income for a taxpayer in the seventy percent bracket was just 
under five percent. However, for a taxpayer in the twenty percent 
bracket, the effective rate was almost seven percent. In absolute 
amounts, the lower-bracket taxpayer paid a greater penalty than the 
upper-bracket taxpayer. The inequity is even more dramatically il-
lustrated by the amount of these penalties relative to the regular tax 
paid. For the taxpayer in the seventy percent bracket, the preference 
tax penalty amounted to fourteen percent of the effective regular tax 
rate on capital gains of thirty-five percent. But for the taxpayer in 
the twenty percent bracket, the penalty amounted to nearly seventy 
120. I.R.C. §§ 56-58. 
121. A detailed critique of the preference tax and of the alternative minimum tax, in which 
a demonstration is undertaken that a modification of the definition of taxable income would 
have been preferable to either, appears in Coven, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Proving 
Again That Two Wrongs .Do Not Make a Right, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1093 (1980). 
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percent of his regular tax rate on capital gains of ten percent. As a 
deterrent to converting ordinary income into capital gains, the pref-
erence tax was effective only for relatively low-bracket taxpayers. 
Particularly with respect to capital gains but also generally, the 
preference tax impaired the vertical equity of the rate structure. 122 
However, because the tax caused those subject to its penalty to pay 
an amount of tax more nearly resembling the tax that they would 
pay under an ideal income tax, the preference tax might appear to 
have promoted horizontal equity. Vertical and horizontal equity, 
however, are related concepts. The preference tax may move both 
seventy percent-bracket taxpayer A and twenty percent-bracket 
taxpayer B closer to their ideal tax burden. If the correction applied 
to B is greater than the correction applied to A, vertical equity is 
distorted. But A and B may also be compared with seventy percent-
bracket taxpayer C and twenty percent-bracket taxpayer D, neither 
of whom claimed any tax preferences. 
In light of the relationship betweenA and C after the application 
of the preference tax, B is overtaxed relative to D. Conversely, given 
the relationship established between B and D, A is undertaxed rela-
tive tq C. Before the preference tax was imposed,A andB stood in a 
position relative to C and D that was explainable, and perhaps justi-
fiable, in terms of the response by A and B to the tax incentive that 
Congress deliberately granted. But the preference tax arbitrarily dis-
torted the relationship between taxpayers claiming preferences and 
those not claiming preferences. That result is incompatible with the 
notion of horizontal equity. 
Since 1978 the preference tax has only applied to preferences re-
sulting from the deferral of tax by accelerated methods of deprecia-
tion. The effect of the preference tax upon such deferments is highly 
complex. Indeed, one substantial objection to the preference tax is 
that it requires sophisticated ~ancial analysis to determine whether 
accelerated depreciation remains beneficial in light of the penalty 
imposed.123 
The preference· tax is also objectionable because it bears more 
heavily upon the less preferential accelerations than it does upon the 
longer, or more preferential, accelerations. Accelerated depreciation 
reduces the taxpayer-investor's real after-tax investment by the pro-
portion of his nominal investment equal to his tax bracket. For ex-
ample, for a taxpayer in the sixty percent bracket, a deductible 
122. See id. at 1096-97 n.18. 
123. See Brogdon & Fisher,Accelerated .Depreciation v. the Minimum Tax, 56 TAXES 530, 
530 (1978). 
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expenditure of$100 has a net after-tax cost of only forty dollars since 
the deduction creates tax savings of sixty dollars. By producing a 
higher real rate of return, this reduction in net investment presuma-
bly encourages investment. To the investor, the accelerated deduc-
tion has an actual value of the after-tax return derived on the tax 
savings between the point in time that he took the accelerated deduc-
tion and the time when the deduction would have been proper under 
an ideal income tax. That is, the benefits of the deferral of tax persist 
while the deduction remains accelerated. The amount of the prefer-
ence tax, however, is determined by the size of the reduction in taxa-
ble income produced by the acceleration and, to a lesser extent, by 
the investor's tax bracket.124 Thus, one of the major determinants of 
the value of the preference, the deferral period, is not taken into ac-
count in establishing the preference penalty. As a result, shorter ac-
celerations are taxed more heavily. 
In 1978, Congress removed capital gains and itemized deductions 
from the preference tax, and subjected them to a new form of pen-
alty - the alternative minimum tax. 125 The alternative tax repre-
sents the most extreme movement to date from the use of taxable 
income as the primary distributional mechanism in the taxing sys-
tem. The tax is truly an alternative since it is computed on a differ-
ent tax base and uses a different rate schedule. In general, the 
alternative tax base comprises three components: (a) gross income 
less all deductions, which resembles taxable income computed with-
out regard to the nondeductibility of the zero bracket amount, except 
that the subtraction may produce a negative amount; (b) the ex-
cluded portion of capital gains; and (c) the amount by which the sum 
of most itemized deductions exceeds sixty percent of adjusted gross 
income less the limited itemized deductions. 126 The alternative tax 
was designed to exempt capital gains from any penalty unless the 
taxpayer reduced his regularly computed taxable income below an 
amount equal to the taxable portion of the capital gain.127 This pe-
124. Id. 
125. I.R.C. § 55. 
126. This ''preference" nicely illustrates congression'al ambivalence toward taxable income 
in general and the itemized deductions in particular. For the minority of taxpayers entitled to 
claim such deductions, a penalty is imposed if too great a deduction is claimed. While many 
itemized deductions, like many other deductions, contain a preferential component and the 
claiming of substantial amounts of such deductions may correlate with tax sheltering activities, 
the arbitrariness of this preference item is intolerably great. 
127. Coven, supra note 121, at 1102-03. Congress sought to preserve this relationship in 
the wake of the 1981 tax rate revisions. Beginning in 1982, the maximum tax rate is to be 
reduced from 70% to 50%. With the preservation of the exemption of 60% of capital gains 
from tax, the effective maximum rate of tax applicable to such gains is to be reduced from 28% 
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nalized taxpayers for offsetting capital gains income with ordinary 
losses - an entirely reasonable objective and one that quite easily 
could have been reached within the existing framework of the taxing 
system. 
The alternative tax, however, is irrational and inequitable. These 
problems have been sufficiently detailed elsewhere, 128 and need only 
be summarized here. The tax reaches a quite simple result through 
an absurdly complex mechanism. It absolutely bars itemized deduc-
tions, regardless of the presence of capital gains, if those deductions 
reduce taxable income below approximately ten percent of adjusted 
gross income. As a side effect, the alternative tax penalizes the 
claiming of some credits and bars the claiming of others. 
But the penalties imposed by the alternative tax bear no rational 
relationship to its primary objective, which is to penalize taxpayers 
who offset the taxable portion of a capital gain with ordinary deduc-
tions in excess of ordinary income. If that offsetting occurs, and the 
alternative tax becomes payable, the penalty imposed is the reduc-
tion of the tax benefit attributable to claiming further deductions. 
The amount of that penalty is a function of the difference between 
the taxpayer's regular marginal rate and the lower alternative tax 
rate, which normally is the maximum twenty-five percent rate. Thus 
high-bracket taxpayers are subject to a disproportionately greater 
penalty than are low-bracket taxpayers. The amount of the penalty 
is unaffected by either the amount or proportion of taxable capital 
gains offset by ordinary deductions. As a result, taxpayers in high 
brackets are penalized relatively more severely than are taxpayers in 
low brackets even if the absolute amount of capital gains sheltered 
from tax by a high-bracket taxpayer is smaller than the amount shel-
tered by a low-bracket taxpayer, and thus represents a far smaller 
proportion of his entire capital gain. 
2. Solutions Compatible with Taxable Income 
Although the alternative tax and the preference tax produce very 
different patterns of taxation, the unsatisfactory results obtained 
under both penalties are directly attributable to attacking abuses of 
the tax incentive provisions outside of the existing taxing system. 
Under both taxes, a tax rate that is unrelated to the taxpayer's regu-
lar rate is imposed on a separately defined tax base. As a result, the 
penalty is not rationally related to either the tax benefit derived from 
to 20%. Accordingly, the maximum alternative tax is to be reduced from 25% to 20%. Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § lOl(a), (d)(l), 9S Stat. -. 
128. Coven, supra note 121,passim. 
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the perceived abuse or the magnitude of the abuse. The adoption of 
the alternative tax is particularly difficult to understand since Con-
gress could have imposed a quite similar penalty within the existing 
framework with greater simplicity and rationality. The tax benefit 
attributable to deductions applied against capital gains could have 
been reduced in a number of ways that would, in effect, require such 
deductions to be offset against capital gains income before claiming 
the capital gains exclusion. Since only forty percent of the capital 
gain would be subject to tax, this approach would eliminate the tax 
benefit of sixty percent of the deductions so used at any level of in-
come. In the reverse situation under present law - offsetting capital 
losses against ordinary income - an analogous penalty is imposed 
that requires two dollars of a capital loss to offset one dollar of ordi-
nary income.129 
Two of the proposals that Congress ultimately rejected demon-
strate the feasibility of limiting preferences consistently with the tax-
able income mechanism. In the first serious legislative attempt to 
address the excessive claiming of tax preferences, the House of Rep-
resentatives attempted to fashion an appropriate response to the in-
equities caused by the undue depression of income.130 This proposal 
limited the aggregate benefits of a specified list of preferential deduc-
tions and exclusions to fifty percent of a taxpayer's income before 
reduction by those preferences.131 The Senate Finance Committee 
rejected this proposal in the belief that preferences would impose 
unequal penalties on taxpayers claiming the same amount of prefer-
ences because their other income would place them in different tax 
brackets. 132 
That objection, of course, was frivolous. Any disallowance of a 
deduction or an exclusion, such as interest expenses incurred to carry 
tax-exempt bonds133 or the capital loss limitations, 134 has that effect. 
The loss of a tax benefit to a high-bracket taxpayer invariably costs 
more than the loss of the same benefit to a low-bracket taxpayer be-
cause the high-bracket taxpayer derives a greater tax benefit from 
the allowance. But when the expenditure does not constitute a 
proper reduction of the tax base, it is appropriately disallowed re-
129. I.R.C. §§ 12ll(b)(l)(C)(ii), 1212(b)(2)(B). 
130. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1969) U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 1645, 1655. · 
131. H.R. 13270, § 30l(a)(l), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
132. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 101, at 113, [1969) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 
2143. 
133. 1.R.C. § 254(2). 
134. I.R.C. § 1211. 
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gardless of that after-tax impact. Indeed, if the after-tax conse-
quences of the clisallowance or other penalty did not vary with the 
taxpayer's marginal rate, the provision would be inequitable. Some 
taxpayers would lose the entire tax benefit of the expenditure subject 
to the clisallowance provision, but others would lose only a portion 
of that benefit. 
In 1971, the Senate again rejected a House limitation on prefer-
ences that was consistent with taxable income. In its proposed "limi-
tation on artificial losses"135 (LAL), the House adopted a schedular 
approach to limiting preferences, in contrast with the generalized ap-
proach of the earlier bill. Under the LAL, deductions attributable to 
specified preferences could only offset income produced in the activ-
ity in which the incentive was claimed; these deductions could not be 
used to reduce taxable income from unrelated sources. On balance, 
the more focused attack of the LAL may have generated too many 
undesirable side-effects;136 the earlier proposal was safer. Both pro-
posals, however, demonstrated that it is feasible to limit preferences 
within the mechanism of taxable income consistently with the no-
tions of distributional equity that inhere in that concept. 
Congress's effort to restrict tax preferences137 thus provides a 
third illustration of the material erosion of the role of taxable income 
in the allocation of tax liability. Like the adoption of the multiple 
rate structure and the multiple tax base created by the zero bracket 
amount, the use of secondary mechanisms to accomplish Congress's 
general objective was unnecessary. A more equitable and efficient 
relult could have been obtained through direct modifications of the 
definition of taxable income. 
The use of secondary mechanisms that actually constitute in-
dependent systems of taxation, such as the preference and alternative 
135. H.R. 10612, § lOl(a), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
136. The schedular approach, for example, might have favored established, diversified tax-
payers and prejudiced legitimate but new or single-purpose businesses as well as tax shelter 
operations. 
137. The third enacted provision was the so-called maximum tax contained in I.R.C. § 
1348. The general effect of this provision was to exempt earned income from progressive tax 
brackets in excess of 50%. The purpose of this rate relief was to reduce the incentive for highly 
compensated taxpayers to claim the benefits of tax incentive provisions. H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, 
supra note 130, at 208, [1969) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 1725. To the extent that the 
maximum tax imposes a different rate of tax upon a class of income, it is as erosive of the role 
of taxable income and as objectionable as the provisions discussed in the text. Indeed, the 
congressional resort to the use of a tax preference to discourage the use of other tax preferences 
is the epitome of irrational tax legislation. When the maximum generally applicable rate of 
tax was reduced from 70% to 50%, there was no inclination on the part of Congress to perpetu-
ate the preference for earned income. Accordingly, I.R.C. § 1348 was repealed. Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § lOl(c), 95 Stat.-. 
August 1981) Taxable Income 1571 
taxes, unnecessarily complicates the tax laws. Currently each of 
these secondary levies is relatively simple in comparison with the 
regular income tax. The absence of discrimination that produces 
such simplicity is acceptable because of the relatively low rate at 
which these taxes are imposed- a maximum of twenty-five percent. 
But if Congress increases the rate of either tax, it may become neces-
sary, given the realities of the legislative process, to adjust the equita-
ble or incentive-retarding impact of the more burdensome tax 
through a series of detailed inclusions and exclusions. Indeed, it is 
conceivable that the alternative tax will rival the existing Code in 
length and complexity. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the last decade, Congress has substantially eroded the. role 
of taxable income in the distribution of the burden of taxation, and 
has increasingly relied upon the less refined concept of adjusted 
gross income, or upon a reconstructed measure of taxable income. 
When recourse is made to adjusted gross income, the tax laws 
"merely" become less fair. It is difficult to know the extent to which 
this unfairness is perceived by the general taxpaying population, or 
the extent to which the unfairness - if perceived - is resented. 
Taxpayers without significant actual itemized deductions undoubt-
edly appreciate the simplification that the zero bracket amount ap-
proach produces. My suspicion, however, is that taxpayers with 
material expenditures - otherwise deductible - for which they can-
not obtain a tax benefit will perceive the law as essentially unfair and 
resent that unfairness. The extent to which this resentment results in 
tax evasion is unknown and might profitably be explored, but is es-
sentially beside the point. Taxpayers are entitled to a system of taxa-
tion that has not been simplified to the point of essential unfairness. 
When Congress has moved outside of the existing tax structure 
and invented new forms of taxation, the results uniformly have been 
unsatisfactory. The multiple rate structure, for example, created dis-
tinctions that cannot be rationally justified. Worse still is the sorry 
history of Congress's inability to legislate rationally about tax prefer-
ences. Unwilling to address the exploitation of tax incentives di-
rectly, Congress created a second, and then a third, level of taxation 
to undertake that task. This complex approach would be questiona-
ble if it performed perfectly. But the alternative tax, and to a lesser 
extent the preference tax, perform horribly, and may create greater 
inequities than they eliminate. 
Moreover, the use of secondary mechanisms has unnecessarily 
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complicated a statute not noted for its simplicity. Continued con-
gressional ambivalence toward the concept of taxable income un-
avoidably will generate greater complexity in the future. The 
complexity of the existing Code derives not so much from its elabo-
rate detail as from its fragmentation and irrationality. Because of 
the complexity of taxable transactions, any equitable system of in-
come taxation will be complex. But if the complexity represents de-
tail imposed upon a rational substructure, it can be managed - at 
least by those capable of managing the underlying business transac-
tions that are taxed. However, as the law begins to treat similar 
transactions dissimilarly, comprehending its provisions and predict-
ing its consequences become more difficult. 
Unquestionably, taxable income as it has evolved in the United 
States is not the only mechanism that can equitably allocate the tax 
burden. But the ad hoc modifications that have occurred over the 
past decade are not calculated rationally to improve the existing 
structure. The tax base now consists of adjusted gross income for 
seventy-five percent of the taxpaying population. Meanwhile, 
wealthy taxpayers continue to benefit from itemized deductions. 
However, taxpayers that avail themselves too heavily of the overly 
generous exclusion of capital gains income are denied a fraction of 
the benefit from their deductions. Then again, only the very poor 
may claim deductions in excess of roughly ninety percent of their 
adjusted gross income. And all of these variously computed tax 
bases are subject to one of three different rate schedules, and may 
become subject to a fourth-the alternative minimum tax - should 
the taxpayer claim too many allowances. 
One is left with the impression that the system lacks a harmoniz-
ing theme. The suggestion here, of course, is that such a theme exists 
in the traditional concept of taxable income. Until careful consider-
ation produces a comprehensive alternative, the overall equity of our 
tax laws will be greatly enhanced if amendments restore the integrity 
of that concept rather than assume its irrelevance. On the other 
hand, if the trend of the post-1968 legislation continues, the capacity 
of the taxable income mechanism to allocate the tax burden equita-
bly surely will be destroyed. Lacking an alternative mechanism, the 
taxing system can only become increasingly arbitrary and, in tum, 
increasingly unacceptable to the taxpaying population. 
